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ARTICLES
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: STATE 'PRISONERS AND THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTODY-
"Mootness," "Prematurity," and "Immediate Release"
"There is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired." 1
Frank W Smith, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
F OR several centuries the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus has played
a central role in protecting individual liberty, guarding against
unlawful detention and against the exercise of power not in compliance
with the law of the land. Central to the idea of habeas corpus is that
it operates within the limits of unlawful imprisonment or detention. As
the boundary line between lawful and unlawful confinement changes
with growth in recognized individual rights, then the reach of the
Great lArit also shifts.
During the past two decades there has been increased concern with
protecting and expanding the rights guaranteed to one accused of a
crime as shown by such cases as Mapp,2 Douglass Gideon,4 and
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Virginia, 1955; LL.B,
Richmond, 1962; LL.M., Harvard, 1968.
1 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Miranda.5 By these and other decisions the rights of an accused have
been significantly and, in the view of some, radically changed. Al-
though not completely unnoticed, significant development in the writ
has accompanied this recent expansion of rights but has received less
public attention. Perhaps this lack of notice has been due in part to
the emphasis and controversy over the "rights" of the accused with the
means of protecting these "rights" taking a secondary position. To
some observers, the great increase in the use of the Great Writ of
Habeas Corpus in recent years6 may appear to be merely a reflection
of the expansion of the rights which the writ protects. However, dur-
ing this period there have been vital changes in the nature and use of
the writ itself which account in part for its greater utility. The develop-
ment in the writ has greatly shifted and redistributed the political and
judicial power in our federal system as it did in England, and today
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy is an integral part of the
criminal process."
This article will examine the concept of custody, which has been
one of the barriers to the use of the Great Writ as a post-conviction
remedy. Particular reference will be made to multiple offenders who
seek to challenge state convictions on constitutional grounds through
federal habeas corpus. s In three recent decisions,9 the United States
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 In 1941 there were only 134 petitions filed in federal district courts by state
prisoners. S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). In 1963 there were 2147;
3819 in 1964, 5011 in 1965, 5952 in 1966 and 7374 in 1967. 1967 DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 308.
7 For a discussion of the role which the writ played in this shift in the English
system, see generally D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER
AND LIBERTY (1966); R. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF
HABEAS CORPUS As THE WRIT OF LIBERTY, (Okla. State Univ. Publication, Vol. 47, No.
9, Norman, Okla., 1960). For its role in America, see also Meador, Accommodating
State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post Conviction Review, 50 A.BA.J. 928 (1964);
Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA.
L. REv. 286 (1966); R. WALKER, THE AmERICA RECEPTION OF THE WRIT OF LmmaTy,
(Okla. State Univ. Research Reports, Stillwater, Okla. 1961). Walker stated: "As
foreseen in the debates on the Judiciary Act of 1789, practice on habeas corpus has
been a continuing source of problems in defining the relationship between the state
and federal court systems."
S Multiple offenders and recidivists make up a substantial and important segment
of the prison population. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 45-6 (Feb.,
1967). "The most striking fact about offenders who have been convicted of the com-
mon serious crimes of violence and theft is how often many of them continue com-
mitting crimes. Arrest, court and prison records furnish consistent testimony to the
fact that these repeated offenders constitute the hard core of the crime problem."
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Supreme Court has made great inroads into this barrier. In isolation,
these three cases may appear somewhat innocuous; viewed in the back-
ground and development of the Great Writ, their significance may be
more truly appreciated. 10
II
THE ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRIT
Information about the origin and early use of the writ of habeas
corpus is clouded. Almost necessarily most knowledge of the early'
writ must be derived by inference and speculation from the indirect
material available. A common impression is that the Great Vrit has
its source in Magna Carta.', However, other scholars have concluded
that habeas corpus is of earlier origin- 2 Still others have asserted that
the writ did not come into use until many years after Runnymeade.13
These disagreements may be explained in part as differences in defini-
tion as to the essence of habeas corpus. Meador suggests that the gist
of habeas corpus-a judicial order directing a person to have the body
of another before a tribunal at a certain time and place-may be traced
back in court orders to the year 1199, some sixteen years before Magna
Carta. In 1214, one year before Magna Carta, the court's order in
Tyrols Case, based on a criminal complaint, read: ". . . quod Haberet
• .. corpus Baldwinni... ad respondendumn... et quod sumoneret ipsos
Rannulful ... ad prosequedun." 1' Other writers have speculated that
Id. at 45.
9 Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
10 In defining the nature and scope of the writ, the Supreme Court has frequently
considered the history and common law use of the writ. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 399 (1963); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934); Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). The Court's use and interpretation of this history
has been severely criticized: Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 31 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the
High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 451 (1966).
112 BLAcisoN, Comm . 131; 2 COKE INst. 52-3; D. MEuoR, HABEAS CoRPuS AND
MAGNA CARTA: DuAmsm OF PowER AND LIBERTY 5 (1966). He suggests that the first
specific statement that Magna Carta was the source of habeas corpus appears to have
been made in a parliamentary debate in 1626, some 400 years after the proclamation
at Runnymeade in 1215.
12 R. WALxER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPmENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS
THE VRIT OF LBERTY, supra note 7, at 7-16; Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origin
of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN. BAR REv. 92, 94-5 (1938).
Is Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L. Q. REv. 64, 68-72 (1902).
14 F. MAITLA ND, SELE-r PLEAS OF THE CRowN-1200-1225 67 (1888).
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this type of order was known in Roman law and in Normandy."
Meador has concluded that by the time of Magna Carta habeas corpus
was "in effect a forcible summons to bring parties into court to liti-
gate." 16 There is evidence that by the first quarter of the thirteenth
century such orders were fairly well accepted as a forcible summons, 7
and the writ's "simple character as a special kind of summons remained
unaltered as late as the first decades of the fourteenth century." "s By
that time the nature of the writ was fairly clear:
It was not an original writ, that is, it did not mark the commencement
of an action. Rather it was resorted to when preliminary process such
as summons had failed to produce the desired party. Habeas corpus
at this stage was a very versatile process in that it could issue against
any party whether in custody or not, or to any person who might
have custody of the desired party whether public or private.19
During the fourteenth century a new form of habeas corpus
emerged-"corpus cum causa captis et detentionis." Prior to this time
there was no mention in the writ "of production accompanied by a
statement as to the cause of detention." 20 The addition of these words,
"with the cause of the arrest and detention," indicates that at this point
the writ was being used where there was detention and that the is-
suing court had a right to inquire into the cause of the detention. How-
ever, the details of the nature of "cum causa" are not clear.2 ' Meador
suggests that "corpus curn causa realistically can be taken as the start-
ing point in the story of modern habeas corpus." 2 As early as 1341
corpus cum causa was used to require the production before a judge of
a prisoner whose petition disclosed that he should not have been im-
15W. S. CHURCH, A TREATISE OF THE WuT OF HABEAS CoRPus 2-3 (1886); Cohen,
Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-Tbe Emergencies of the Modern Writ-I, 18 CA,. BAR
R~v. 10, 11 (1940). Cohen also concluded that the writ was regularly employed
by the courts during the time of Edward I, 1277-1307. Id. at 12.
16 MEADOR, supra note 11, at 9.
1 7 WALKER, supra note 7, at 13.
38 Cohen, supra note 15, at 11:
19 WALKER, supra note 12, at 15.
20 Cohen, supra note 15, at 11.
21 WALER, supra note 7, at 20. Jenks suggests that the writ of habeas corpus was
not used to test the validity of commitments until around the sixteenth century.
Jenks, supra note 13, at 69-72. Cohen disagrees with Jenks and states that corpus cum
causa may have made its appearance in the first years of the fourteenth century.
Cohen, supra note 15, at 13.
22 MEADOR, supra note 11, at 10.
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prisoned 3 Corpus cur causa was probably the invention of Chancery,
although it was used by the King's Bench and the Common Bench
during the fourteenth century.24
From the fourteenth century until 1679, the writ was involved in the
power struggle and jurisdictional conflicts between the various courts,
the question of Puritan religious belief, and the exercise of the royal pre-
rogative in detaining persons; its use led to the Petition of Right.2
During this time the position the Great Writ could play in distributing
and checking political power began to appear. In Darnel's Case26 the
writ was involved in the political and constitutional power struggle be-
tween the courts and the crown. The case grew out of Charles the
First's attempts to raise money to finance a holy war of his chief
minister, the Duke of Buckingham, against Cardinal Richelieu. Un-
able to raise new taxes through the dissolved Parliament,27 Charles had
ordered certain wealthy men of the realm to make loans to the crown.
Sir Thomas Darnel and four other noblemen refused to make such
"loans." As a result of this refusal, Darnel was put in custody of the
Fleet. Darnel then filed a petition for habeas corpus cum causa, and the
return showed that Darnel was in custody "per speciale mandatum
domini regis" (by Special Command of His Majesty). Thus, the real is-
sue was whether imprisonment by command of the King, without speci-
fication of the cause of the imprisonment, was an answer to the writ. It
was argued on Darnel's behalf that he had not been imprisoned by
the law of the land, in violation of Article 39 of Magna Carta. It was
urged that "[i]f this return shall be good, then his imprisonment shall
not continue only for a time, but for ever; and the subjects of this king-
dom may be restrained of their liberties perpetually and by law there
can be no remedy for the subject." 28 In response to this, the Crown
contended that imprisonment by the King on his own responsibility
was necessary to protect the nation, and that the King was not obli-
gated to give an explanation or have his decision re-examined by
judges, and that the reasons for imprisonment might have to be kept
23 YEAR BooKs or KING EDwARD THE THIRD, YEAR XIV 204 (L. Pike ed. & trans.
1888).
24 WALKFR, supra note 12, at 19-20.
25See generally Cohen, supra note 15, at 20-42; MEADOR, supra note 11, at 13-19.
-0 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627).
27 Charles I had dissolved Parliament in June of 1626 in retaliation for his im-
peachment by that body. Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitze-
fion, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143, 154 (1952).
28 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 8 (1627).
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secret for the benefit of the state.29 The decision was in favor of the
royal prerogative, but
... the importance of habeas corpus was that it had been made the basis
for the attack upon an imprisonment commanded by the King him-
self and had proven a quick method . . . to have one so imprisoned
brought before a competent tribunal and there have himself charged
and heard and the legality of the detention argued and adjudged.
There was no other remedy available to accomplish the same purpose
with the same efficiency. Even though the prisoners in this case were
denied their freedom, the writ did have their case completely aired
before a court.30
Four months later, as a result of Darnels Case, the House of Com-
mons presented to King Charles the Petition of Right. In the Petition
the House of Commons protested imprisonment of freemen without
cause shown either by the King or the Privy Council and petitioned
that in such cases the writ of habeas corpus should be awarded, and
if no cause of commitment be returned with the writ, the party should
be bailed.31 Charles' reluctant answer, under the press of other circum-
stances, came on June 7, 1628-" [L] et right be done." 32 With DarnePs
Case and the Petition of Right, habeas corpus had truly matured as
the remedy to protect freemen from imprisonment except by the law
of the land. Yet there remained difficulties with the common law writ
which Parliament partially dealt with in the famous Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679." 3 One of the serious problems had been the uncertainty
as to which courts had authority to issue the writ and whether it
could be issued in term or during vacation. This uncertainty limited
the effectiveness of the writ and when it could only be issued during
term, delayed its utility. Another deficiency was that there was no
29 For a discussion of the details of the case, see Chafee, supra note 27, at 154-59.
The argument made on behalf of the Crown was similar to that urged during the
American Constitutional Convention in support of a provision for suspension of the
writ in extraordinary circumstances.
30 Cohen, supra note 15, at 38, 39.
31 Portions of the text of the Petition may be found in Chafee, supra note 27, at
159-60. For comment on the Petition, see Cohen, supra note 15, at 39-40.
32 Chafee, supra note 27, at 159. Subsequent to the Petition of Right, Parliament
specifically authorized use of the writ to test the legality of commitment by command
of the King or Privy Council. Act of 1640, 16 Car. I, ch. 10.
3331 Car. II, ch. 7, 8 Statutes at Large, 432-39 (1763). There had been prior




means of compelling the jailer or warden to make a prompt return
in response to the writ. The common practice of waiting for a second
or third command before making the return often meant that no prompt
relief was available. Then, too, it was common practice for the gaoler
to transfer the petitioner out of the jurisdiction or to another party
and make a return showing no custody. Chafee has vividly described
the practice prior to the Habeas Corpus Act:
Because of such defects in the common-law writ of habeas corpus,
the King and his ministers were able to imprison anybody they
objected to, for considerable periods. Low judges were afraid to block
high officials, high judges would not stoop to bother with obscure
prisoners, all judges were reluctant to lift a finger while their courts
were not in session which meant a good part of the year. There
were other tricks. A gaoler would be served with the writ, rush his
prisoner to the Tower, and then make a return that he did not have
him in his custody. The head of the Tower could do likewise, and
so on, always keeping one jump ahead of the courts. Clarendon, the
historian, was accused of sending prisoners to the Channel Islands
and to army garrisons. People had to bribe courtiers to get their rela-
tives out of prisons.3 4
Additionally, the courts refused to allow petitioners to deny the truth
of the return, thus subjecting prisoners to the perjury of the jail-keeper.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 did remedy some of these problems
by providing that the lord chancellor and judges of certain courts were
authorized to issue the writ in term or in vacation. Equally important,
the Act required that the return should be made within certain time
limits, depending on distance, and required that a court, within two
days after the return had been made, either discharge the prisoner or
take sureties for his subsequent appearance before the court. Judges
and jailers who failed to act within these time limits were subject to
fairly substantial penalties. The scope of the Act was quite limited
as it did not extend to "civil" detentions, nor was it available to per-
sons committed for a "felony or treason plainly expressed in the war-
rant of commitment," nor to "persons convict or in execution by legal
process...." r, Relief from civil commitment or detention was left to
9 Chafee, supra note 27, at 150. For a detailed account of the difficulties with the
writ at this time, see Cohen, supra note 15, at 183-84.
35 Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-186f, 32 Cm. L. Rnv. 243, 252 (1965).
Cohen, supra note 15, at 185-97, gives the complete text of the Act and a review of its
1969]
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the unsatisfactory common law writ. Oaks states that "plainly the bene-
fits of this famous English act were intended primarily for individuals
detained for a crime but held without a warrant of commitment or for
individuals held without bail upon a warrant charging a minor of-
fense." 3" Although the provisions regarding use of the writ did not
extend to serious crimes, Article VII of the Act contained speedy trial
provisions for "high treason or felony" and provided that if the person
were not indicted during the term he was to be brought to trial, the
judge was required, upon motion, to admit the prisoner to bail, unless
it appeared that the Crown's witnesses could not have been produced.
If the prisoner then were not indicted and tried during the second term,
he was to be discharged. Perhaps the major problem in connection with
the use of the writ which was not remedied by the Act of 1679 was
the refusal to permit questioning of the truthfulness of the return and to
allow inquiry into the underlying facts. This was to be a shortcoming
of the writ which was to linger on' well into the twentieth century.
It is at this stage in the development of the Great Writ that we
turn to the acceptance of the Writ of Liberty in the English colonies.
III
THE AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WRIT
None of the charters, of the original American colonies contained
provisions for habeas corpus8 7 Prior to the early 1690's there appears
to be no reference in colonial legal records suggesting that habeas
corpus was used to test the validity of commitments. However, during
the 1690's there is evidence that it came into use in the colonies.38 Other
writers have concluded that the writ was not in use in the colonies
until 1710 when the English Habeas Corpus Act was extended to Vir-
ginia."9 Walker attributes this delay in acceptance of the writ to the
lack of practicality and lack of necessity for its use, which was inherent
in the primitive institutional and legal structure:
The writ of habeas corpus presumed a reasonable separation of
remedial effect. Art. VIII of the Act provided that the Act could not be used by a
person "charged with debt."
36 Oaks, supra note 35, at 252.
37 Chafee, supra note 27, at 146.
S8 R. WALYER, THE AMERicAN RECEPTION OF THE WRIT OF LIBERTv, 1 (Okla. State




powers in general and an independent judiciary in particular, But in
the colonies a most simple governmental -system prevailed in the
earlier periods. There was a complete lack of any clear or consistent
division of power and little institutional separation of functions.40
Frontier justice, because of its equitable and quick nature, did not
present crucial problems of personal liberty until the latter part of the
seventeeth century.4' "In short, the problem of individuals languishing
in jail without expeditious legal resolution of their causes did not exist
in any serious form." 42
During the 1670's the Crown began to assert more control over the
colonies, and there is evidence that Magna Carta and habeas corpus
were asserted against exercise of royal authority, although unsuccess-
fully.43 From around 1690 the reception and use of habeas corpus seem
clear,44 and by 1710 with a change in royal policy, Governor Spotswood
of Virginia proclaimed America's first effective habeas corpus act:
. . . Whereas We are above all things desirous that all our Subjects
may enjoy their legal Rights, You are to take especial care that if
any person be committed for any Criminal matters (unless for Treason
or felony plainly and especially expressed in the Warrant of Com-
mitment) he have free liberty to petition by himself, or otherwise,
the Chief Barron or any of the Judges of the Common pleas for a,
writ of Habeas Corpus... 45
Similar extensions of habeas corpus soon followed in North arid '
South Carolina,46 and North Carolina became the first state to make a
constitutional provision in December, 1776, when the North Carolina
Convention in its Declaration of Rights, Article XIII, provided:"
40 Id. at 3.
41 Id. at 5.
42 Id. at 6.
43 a at 8-10. In 1684 the Privy Council had disallowed the New York Charter of
Liberties which sought to incorporate Magna Carta and the English Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679. The Council ruled that such .acts did not apply to the colonies unless
specific reference to the colonies had been made in the acts. Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania also failed in similar attempts to make use of the Habeas Corpus Act.
However, other colonies, e.g., South Carolina in the 1690's, put the writ into use by
indirection. Id. at 11-12.
44 Id. at 12.
451d. at 13. The exclusion for treason or felony followed the pattern of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679.
46 ld.
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That every freeman restrained of his liberty, is entitled to a remedy,
to inquire into the lawfulness thereof and to remove the same, if un-
lawful; and that such remedy ought not to be denied or delayed.47
Although the Articles of Confederation contained no provision re-
garding habeas corpus,4" by the time of the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention in 1787, habeas corpus was so well accepted as to be viewed
by many as an inherent right, requiring no constitutional provision."
At that time, four of the thirteen states-Georgia, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and North Carolina-had constitutional guarantees of habeas
corpus;50 three other states-Virginia, New York and Pennsylvania-
had statutory provisions." Apparently, South Carolina was the only
state with a Habeas Corpus Act at the time of the Declaration of
Independence, having copied in 1712 the English Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679.52 Almost without exception when the original thirteen colonies
passed habeas corpus acts, they were modeled after the English Act
and did not extend to persons charged with felony or treason or "per-
sons convict." 53
During the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent ratifying
convention, much of the debate concerned whether it was necessary
to provide for habeas corpus and whether there should be any provi-
sion for suspension of the writ.5 4 The result was article 1, section 9,
clause 2 of the Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public safety may require it." Objections were raised to
the negative form of the clause, and four state conventions urged that
a guarantee of the privilege of habeas corpus should be incorporated
47 Chafee, supra note 27, at 145.
48 1 d.
49 See WALKER, supra note 38, at 15.
50 Oaks, supra note 35, at 247. Chafee concluded that provisions for the writ were
omitted from most early state constitutions because "it had been so long and solidly
established in every colony that assertion was probably considered unnecessary."
Chafee, supra note 27, at 144. Oaks questions whether habeas corpus was so solidly
established at this time. Oaks, supra note 35, at 248.
53 Oaks, supra note 35, at 251.
52 Id.
j3 Id. at 253. The sole exception was Connecticut, which disregarded the English
Act and drafted its own act.
54 See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Consicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative
Grace? 40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 341-44 (1952).
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into a bill of rightsr 5 However, no provision was enacted into the Bill
of Rights.
The First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established
a system of federal courts, provided:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have
power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus... And that either
of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Judges of the Dis-
trict Courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for
the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.56
For approximately the next hundred years, because the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts in habeas corpus did not extend to per-
sons held in custody by a state, most of the litigation was in the
state courtsY However, the early state case decisions do not give
an accurate or reliable picture of the actual use of the writ in
the states. This is partly due to deficiencies in reporting and the
fact that in many of the states the decisions of the courts having
habeas corpus jurisdiction were not reported."'
During the nineteenth century most of the petitions for the writ
which involved criminal commitment were not for post-conviction re-
lief. Many of the petitions were filed immediately after arrest and be-
fore the accused had been produced before a magistrate for formal
commitment." During this period habeas corpus petitions brought after
conviction were confronted with the barriers imposed by most of the
state provisions, which had been modeled after the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679. They did not extend the writ to those "persons
convict or in execution by legal process," and the almost insurmount-
able obstacle that the truth of the return to the writ could not be
questioned.60 Prior to 1850 there were very few reported decisions in-
5Id. at 342. Collings, after study of the historical background of the suspension
clause, concluded: "It is unlikely that the Framers viewed the clause as establishing
a federal right to habeas corpus .... It is far more likely that the Framers in drafting
the clause were concerned only with limiting the powers of Congress." Id. at 344.
561 Stat. 81, § 14. Collings suggests that this indicated that the First Congress did
not view the habeas corpus clause of the Constitution as establishing an affirmative
right to the privilege. Collings, supra note 54, at 345.
57 Oaks, supra note 35, at 246.
58 Id. at 255-57.
59 Id. at 258.
6OId. at 260-61. See several early state court cases denying habeas corpus relief
to convicts on the ground that the statute specifically excluded them from the benefit
of the writ, id. at 261.
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volving petitions by convicts, but thereafter, for no apparent reason,
the number significantly increased.6 1
Returning to the development of the federal writ, the constitution-
ality of the habeas corpus clause of the Judiciary Act, conferring au-
thority on the Supreme Court to issue the writ, was upheld in Ex Parte
Bollman_. 2 Chief Justice Marshall, although looking to the common
law for the nature of the writ, said that "any power to award the
writ by any of the courts of the United States must be given by writ-
ten law." 03 One of the most significant changes in the federal writ
was made by the Act of February 5, 1867, which extended the writ to
persons held under state commitment by conferring on the United
States courts "power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States." 84 As pointed
out above, prior to this time because of the limits on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, most of the litigation had been in the state courts.
The popular impression is that the Act of February 5, 1867, was de-
signed to deal with the problems anticipated in the South during Re-
construction,65 but its real utility in the Reconstruction era has been
questioned. Mayers, in a well-documented study of the legislative his-
tory of the Act of 1867, makes a convincing refutation of the popula,"
conception that a purpose of the Act was to extend federal habeas
01 7d. at 261 & n. 84. Oaks suggests that the common law writ had no greater scope
in regard to convicts than did the writ under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 or
other similar legislation. Id. at 262.
62 g U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
63 Id. at 94.
04 Act of Feb. 5, 1867. ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). For a survey of the statu-
tory changes in the writ, see H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1236-237 (1953); Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review, 33
F.R.D. 363 (1963); Longsdorf, Federal Habeas Corpus Acts, Original and Amended,
13 F.R.D. 407 (1953).
65 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16 (1963); HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 64, at 1237; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 426 (1961); Collings, supra note 54, at 351. Mayers
contends that this popular view is erroneous and that the writ, by its very nature,
was useless to protect against violence and was only of value if the person charged
with violation of a state statute attacked the constitutionality of the statute; that the
first such reported case in the South did not arise until eight years after the Act
was passed when Reconstruction was virtually completed. Mayers, supra note 10, at
49-50. Mayers states, "as it turned out, the habeas act, instead of aiding the military
government in dealing with southern resistence, hindered it. . . . [T]he new statute
actually gave aid to those who might be imprisoned by the military for resisting re-
construction." Id. at 51. As a case in point, Mayers cites the "resister" in Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See text p. 13 infra.
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corpus to state prisoners and concludes that Congress did not intend
to include state prisoners."6 The Act was passed apparently with very
little consideration given to it, either in committee or on the floor of
either house. Mayers, with force, contends that the Act was designed
to protect the rights of freedmen, particularly from labor contracts67
and contracts of indenture and apprenticeship. In support of this view
Mayers points out that the "bill did not speak, as did the three existing
habeas corpus statutes, of 'prisoners in jail'; it spoke instead of 'any
person ... restrained of his or her liberty', a phrase apt for describing
an ex-slave held in bondage or peonage." 1s In support of his view that
the Act was not intended to extend to state prisoners, Mayers con-
siders as particularly significant the novel provisions of the Act allow-
ing a denial of the return and allowing a court "to proceed in a sum-
mary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testi-
mony .... ,69
An equally important extension of the writ to state prisoners, but
yet frequently unnoticed, was the provision in the Act providing for
an inquiry into the facts surrounding the detention, thus opening the
way to some questioning of the verity of the return to the writ.70 One
of the first major cases under the Act of February 5, 1867, was Ex
Parte McCardle.7 McCardle, by means of habeas corpus in a federal
circuit court, had challenged his alleged illegal restraint, imposed by a
military court under the Military Government Act of 1867. The writ
had issued, but the case decided adversely to McCardle on the merits,
and as permitted by the Act of 1867, McCardle had been allowed an
appeal from the circuit court to the United States Supreme Court.
66 Mayers, supra note 10, at 43.
67 In several states a person in breach of a labor contract could be punished by
criminal sanctions. Id. at 44.
68 1d. at 35.
69 Id. at 41. Mayers argued that "in the then conventional pattern of the habeas
corpus proceeding on behalf of a prisoner held pending trial, determination of is-
sues of fact was almost unknown. The writ was addressed to the jailer, who made a
return. . . . The sole question before the court was the formal legality of the de-
tention. There was no more occasion for the taking of testimony and summary ascer-
tainment of 'material facts' in the case of state than of federal prisoners for whom no
such provision had ever been found necessary. A plausible explanation of the provi-
sion for determination of fact which is consistent with the genesis of the bill is
that the draftsman envisaged a habeas proceeding, instituted not on behalf of a
prisoner, but of an ex-slave, allegedly 'restrained of his liberty' under an apprentice-
ship or contract labor statute." Id. at 47.
70 Collings, supra note 54, at 351. The Act provided: "The petitioner may deny
any of the material facts set forth in the return or may allege any fact."
7174 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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However, while the appeal was pending, Congress passed the Act of
March 27, 1868,2 withdrawing the authority for the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court for habeas corpus from the circuit courts,
and the Supreme Court dismissed McCardle's appeal, holding that it
no longer had jurisdiction. The case is often used in support of the
view that there is no inherent or constitutional right to habeas corpus,
only a statutory right.73
Although the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had no great immediate
impact, when combined with the fourteenth amendment which was de-
clared ratified shortly thereafter in 1868, the basis for the writ's later
importance and its present position in preserving due process and equal
protection had been laid. However, the early role of the "new" habeas
72 Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Star. 44. The purpose of this withdrawal
of jurisdiction apparently was to prevent the United States Supreme Court from pass-
ing on the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act of 1867. Mayers, supra note 10,
at 46. This appellate jurisdiction was not restored until 1885 by the Act of March 3,
1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
73 See, e.g., Collings, supra note 54, at 348 where he states: "The famous case of Ex
parte McCardle provided the most dramatic illustration of the life and death power
of the Congress over habeas corpus jurisdiction." The question of whether there is a
constitutional right to some type of habeas corpus is perhaps academic, but it has
been raised in connection with what limitations may be placed upon use of the writ
by Congress. Did the habeas corpus clause, although cast in negative terms, create an
affirmative right to the writ and if so, what is the nature of the writ? Chief Justice
Marshall in Ex parte Bollman rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had
inherent power to issue the writ by saying, "any power to award the writ by any
of the courts of the United States must be given by written law." See text p. 12
supra. Collings concludes from these cases that "the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in habeas corpus cases is subject to exception and regulation by Con-
gress. No lower court can issue the writ unless such jurisdiction is conferred by statute.
Thus Congress can deny the courts of appeal jurisdiction to issue the writ." Collings,
supra note 54, at 348.
In Jones v. Cunningham the Court said: "The habeas corpus jurisdictional statute
implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made avail-
able. While limiting its availability to those 'in custody,' the statute does not attempt
to mark the boundaries of 'custody' nor in any way other than by use of that word
attempt to limit the situation in which the writ can be used." Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963). Can Congress deny or suspend the writ by withdrawing
from the federal courts jurisdiction to issue the writ? The question was raised, but
not decided, in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). See Brief for the
Respondent at 27-41 by Professor Paul A. Freund. It was urged that substitution of
the motion procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) for federal prisoners suspended
their constitutional right to habeas corpus. See also MEADOR, supra note 11, at 32-8. This
unresolved question of whether there is a constitutional, not merely statutory, right
to federal habeas corpus may be relevant to the concept of custody. If there is some
constitutional right, what is the nature of the writ? Is "custody" a suspension of this




corpus and the fourteenth amendment was not too significant and
hardly foretold the role the two have played during the past several
decades. Judge Walter V. Shaefer observed:
But looking back on the half century following the ratification of
the fourteenth amendment one is struck by the absence of decisions
in the areas which today seem of critical importance .... [W]e find
that the Court was largely concerned with problems which today seem
technical or even insubstantial .... 74
Meador has pointed out that this convergence of the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 and the fourteenth amendment was a reunion in the new
world of the Great Charter and the Great Writ.
The Parliamentarians of the 1620's had taken due process, derived
from chapter 39 of Magna Carta, and matched it with the remedy of
habeas corpus. Now across the sea in the 1860's the Reconstruction
Congress had taken this same inherited concept of due process, made
it a federally imposed limitation on the States and extended the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy for its transgressions. But few men, if
any, in the 1860's realized the full import of what had been wrought.
They could scarcely have foreseen the vast constitutional change
which would come about in the following century through this com-
bination of the Act of February 5, 1867, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.75
Before this fusion could indeed become effective, the writ had to be
unshackled from a restrictive view as to its scope. In early cases the
United States Supreme Court had held that the writ was unavailable
to one held for trial or convicted of a felony in a court having juris-
diction of the offense and of the person, limiting the scope of the writ
to questions of jurisdiction of the state or convicting court.76 This re-
t4 Schaefer, Federalirm and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956).
He suggests that the lack of significant decisions was not due to a reluctance of the
Court to decide such cases but was due in part to lack of access to the courts. Id.
at 4. Collings states that the major reason for this dearth of cases was that the Court
was slow to develop the "sophisticated possibilities of the due process clause." Col-
lings, supra note 54, at 352.
75 MnaR, supra note 11, at 57.
7
oSee, e.g., Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.
193 (1830). There seems to have been some minor deviations from this in cases of
criminal contempt due to a lack of another remedy for review. Oaks, supra note 35,
at 263-64.
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strictive view was weakened by the Court in 1889 in Hans Nielsen, Peti-
tioner,77 when the Court said that a "party is entitled to a habeas corpus,
not merely where the court is without jurisdiction of the cause, but
where it has no constitutional authority or power to condemn the pris-
oner.... ." 78 And in 1915 this jurisdictional concept was seriously ques-
tioned in Frank v. Mangum,79 when the Court suggested that a state
court having jurisdiction might "lose" jurisdiction where the trial was
so affected by mob influence as to be a denial of due process.80
By this time other changes brought about by the Act of 1867 were
emerging. Federal courts entertaining habeas corpus petitions were not
limiting their inquiry into whether the convicting court had jurisdiction,
but were looking behind the verity of the return and examining not
only the record but evidence outside the original criminal record to de-
termine if there had been a "loss" of jurisdiction due to denial of con-
stitutional rights. In succeeding cases such as Johnson v. Zerbst,8' Waley
v. Johnston,82 Walker v. Johnston8 and others, the question of lack of
jurisdiction has gradually been equated to constitutionally defective trial
or denial of constitutional rights, so that today it is probably accurate
to say that the writ may be used to test the constitutional validity of a
conviction without resort to the rhetoric of "lack of jurisdiction." 84
In tracing the development of the present-day writ, other significant
77131 U.S. 176 (1889).
78 Id. at 184.
79 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
80 In the Frank case, however, the Court concluded that the state had afforded an
adequate and full review on the merits of the question of whether the prisoner was in
custody in violation of the Constitution. For a discussion of the alteration of this
"jurisdictional" concept of the scope of the writ, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note
64, at 1248-268; Collings, supra note 54, at 352-54.
81304 U.S. 458 (1938).
82316 U.S. 101 (1942). There the Court said: "The issue here [coerced plea of
guilty] was appropriately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts relied on
are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to con-
sideration and review on appeal. In such circumstances the use of the writ in the
federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not re-
stricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of juris-
diction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases
where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused,
and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights." Id. at 104-
05.
83 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
84 See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 196
(1955); Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61
HARv. L. REV. 657 (1948).
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developments in a trilogy of cases, Fay v. Noia,85 Townsend v. Sain86
and Sanders v. United States, 7 should be noted. The common concern
of these cases
... is that at some point in the criminal process a convicted person gets
a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of every federal right he
asserts. That is the central requirement which must be recognized.
The Court allows . . . that if the prisoner gets such a hearing in a
state court, that may suffice....
The policy decision for every state now is whether it wants to open
up its convictions to collateral attack in its own courts on all fed-
eral constitutional grounds. If the state will provide this collateral
remedy, it will be in a position to make a final disposition in a large
proportion of its criminal cases. But if the state does not provide that
kind of remedy, it is probable that an equally large proportion of its
cases will be retried in part in the federal district court.88
While the above developments were unfolding, there was another
aspect of the use of the writ which did not keep pace with the change.
Much like the situation earlier in England where the uncertainty as
to when and which court could issue the writ had reduced and de-
layed its utility, so has the concept of custody limited its effectiveness
here.
IV
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTODY
One of the landmark cases construing the provisions of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 came in 1934 in McNally v. Hill.9 McNally had
been convicted in a federal court on a three-count indictment and had
been given a two-year sentence on the first count and four years on
the second and third counts, with the sentences on the first and second
counts to be served concurrently, and the sentence received on the
second and third counts to run consecutively. While serving the sen-
tence received on the second count, but before beginning service on
the third count, McNally filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
85 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
86 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
87 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
88 Meador, Accomodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post Conviction
Review, 50 AJ.AJ. 928, 929 (1964).
119293 U.S. 131 (1934).
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in a federal district court, attacking as void only the conviction under
the third count. On the question of whether the writ could be invoked
to test the validity of the conviction on the third count, the substance
of McNally's argument was that under the existing Parole Act90 a
prisoner was eligible for parole after he had served one-third of the
sentences received; that he had served one-third of the sentences re-
ceived on counts one and two but less than one-third of the total
sentences received for all three, and consequently, consideration of his
application for parole was precluded by the void sentence received
on count three. In holding that habeas corpus could not be used to attack
the third count, the court said:
We conclude that, as it appears from the petition that the detention
of petitioner is lawful under the sentence on the second count, there
is no occasion in a habeas corpus proceeding for inquiry into the
validity of his conviction under the third.91
Acknowledging that neither the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,
granting power to the Supreme Court and the district courts to issue
the writ, nor the Constitution -9 2 defined the writ, the Court turned to
the common law and English usage andconcluded:
There is no warrant . . .for its use to invoke judicial determination
of questions which could not affect the lawfulness of the custody
and detention, and no suggestion of such a use has been found in the
commentaries on the English common law. Diligent search of the
English authorities and the digests before 1789 has failed to disclose
any case where the writ was sought or used, either before or after
conviction, as a means of securing the judicial decision of any ques-
tion which, even if determined in the prisoner's favor, could not
have resulted in his immediate release.
Such use of the writ in the federal courts is without the support of
history or of any language in the statutes which would indicate a pur-
pose to enlarge its traditional function.... [T] he Judiciary Act ...
was at pains to declare that the writ might issue for the purpose of
inquiring into the cause of restraint of liberty.. . .Equally, without
restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used. A sentence
90 Parole Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819, as amended, Act of Janu-
ary 23, 1913, ch. 9, 37 Star. 650, 18 U.S.C. § 714 (1964).
01 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 135 (1934).
92 U.S. CONns. art. I, § 9, cl.2 is cast only in negative terms that the writ shall not be
suspended. See text p. 10 s-upra.
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which the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be the cause of
restraint which the statute makes the subject of inquiry.93
From McNally and the requirement of custody9" there have de-
veloped three approaches or interpretations, traceable to the language
used in McNally.95 The first is the doctrine of prematurity, i.e., that
habeas corpus may not be used to challenge a sentence not presently
being served, but one that is to be served in the future. The second is
the concept of mootness-that a sentence already served cannot be chal-
lenged by habeas corpus. These two are based on the idea that there is
no present restraint due to the fully-served or future sentence. The third
approach, which might be called the "immediate release concept," has
been based on a somewhat different rationale. Relying upon the language
of McNally, this approach has centered on the relief which may be
afforded by the writ and denied use of the writ unless the petitioner, if
successful in his challenge, would be entitled to immediate release from
custody 9
For multiple offenders, particularly state prisoners, seeking use of fed-
eral habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy, these three branches
of the custody requirement have had a particular impact, although they
have affected the single offender also.97 McNally and the requirements
of "custody," as they have generally been applied in the past to multiple
offenders, have violated the spirit of habeas corpus. Until the recent
overruling of McNally,98 by continued allusions to its validity, the
93 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 137-38 (1934).
04 The present statutory provisions for federal habeas corpus are 28 U.S.C. § 2241-
2254. (1964, Supp. 1968). The "custody" requirement pertinent to a state prisoner
provides: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless .... [h]e
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964).
95Although McNally was decided under the federal statute, the state decisions
generally have followed the concept of custody and its progeny. Recently, however,
some states have departed from the traditional approach. The state cases are col-
lected in Note, Habeas Corpus and the Prematurity Rule, 66 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1164
(1966); Note, Habeas Corpus and Prematurity, 52 CoaNEa L. Q. 149 (1966); Note,
Federal Habeas Corpus-The Search for a Solution to the Prematurity Concepts, 1
VAL. U. L. Rnv. 155 (1966).
')it is submitted that this "immediate release" approach erroneously emphasized
the type of relief which could be afforded rather than looking to the purpose of the
writ which is to inquire into and remove unlawful restraint on liberty. The emphasis
upon the relief of "immediate release" ignored the present day practice and was not
compelled by the statute. See discussion note 190 infra.
97See cases cited notes 100, 101, 102 infra and accompanying text.
98 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See text p. 36 infra.
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United States Supreme Court undoubtedly contributed to the applica-
tion and unquestioning acceptance of the concepts.
The impact of the custody requirement may be seen by examining
how it has traditionally been applied to multiple offenders seeking to
invoke the writ in various situations. Where a single sentence was being
served and challenged, the courts have generally held that if the sentence
were completely invalid, the writ could be used. 100 These holdings were
not inconsistent with the McNally prematurity branch, as the prisoner
was serving the invalid conviction, and the remedial "immediate release"
approach would be satisfied if the sentence were voided. However, if
the challenge was only to a portion of the sentence received- e.g., the
challenge was that the sentence received exceeded the maximum sen-
tence which could lawfully be imposed-the courts reached differing
results. Some courts, emphasizing the "immediate release," held that the
writ could not be used until the petitioner had served the valid portion
of the sentence, reasoning that until the valid portion was served, the
petitioner was not entitled to be released from custody.' 0 ' Other courts
issued the writ under such circumstances, apparently under the view
that the petitioner was serving or being restrained by the invalid sen-
tence.10
2
For multiple offenders or prisoners who had received more than one
sentence, the question of "custody" arose in various situations. Where
the prisoner was serving two sentences concurrently, the custody re-
quirements posed a dilemma. If only one of the sentences was challenged,
the writ would be denied, as the confinement on the other was valid
99 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950); Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342
(1941). As late as Fay v. Noia, Justice Brennan said: "The difference is illustrated in
the settled principle that if a prisoner is detained lawfully under one count of the
indictment, he cannot challenge the lawfulness of a second count on federal habeas.
McNally 'v. Hill... ." Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 432 (1963).
100 United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894) (dicta); Browning v. Crouse, 356
F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943 (1966). State cases are collected
in Note, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1164 (1966); Note, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 149 (1966).
101 United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894); Carpenter v. Crouse, 358 F.2d
701 (10th Cir. 1966); Browning v. Crouse, 356 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 973 (1966); Fields v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1948); McDonald v.
Johnston, 149 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1945); Ammons v. King, 136 F.2d 318 (8th Cit.
1943). State cases are collected in Note, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1164 (1966); Note, 52
CORNELL L. Q. 149 (1966).
102 United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cit. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964). State cases are collected in Note, 66 COLuM. L. REV.
1164 (1966); Note, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 149 (1966).
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and there could be no immediate release. °3 Consequently, if the valid
sentence was served, there was no present restraint and the issue was
"moot." Thus the prisoner may have never been in a position to attack
by habeas corpus what may have been a concededly illegal sentence-
e.g., under Gideon-even though serious consequences may have re-
sulted from this illegal sentence.104 However, some courts, emphasizing
"present detention," disregarded the "immediate release" aspect on such
concurrent sentences and required only that a present sentence be in-
valid to issue the writ.0 5 Where all of the sentences being served con-
currently were challenged, custody does not seem to have been a bar to
use of the writ.
If the multiple offender had received sentences to be served con-
secutively and the challenge was to the future sentence, the writ typi-
cally has been denied on the basis of McNally, as the prisoner was not
presently restrained by the invalid sentence nor entitled to immediate
release. 1 6 If the first of consecutive sentences was challenged while being
served, many courts denied the writ, reasoning that if the first sentence
were invalidated, the second valid sentence would be accelerated, and
therefore the prisoner was not entitled to immediate release unless suffi-
cient time had been served on the invalid first sentence to permit release
on the subsequent valid sentence.10r Once the petitioner had served this
first of consecutive sentences, he was probably faced with the "moot-
103 King v. California, 356 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1966); Collins v. Klnger, 353 F.2d"
731 (9th Cir. 1965); Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965); Von Eiselein v.
Taylor, 344 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1965); Browning v. Crouse, 327 F.2d 529 (10th Cir.
1964); United States ex rel. Burke v. Fay, 231 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). State cases
are collected in Note, 66 COLJM. L. REV. 1164 (1966); Note, 52 CoRMLL L. Q. 149
(1966).0 4 This invalid concurrent sentence may have a great bearing on the date of
eligibility for parole and also chances for parole. See text p. 44 infra.
105Dora v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1962); State ex rel. Stapleton v. Boles,
149 W. Va. 645, 142 S.E.2d 896 (1965). Other state cases are collected in Note, 66
CoLum. L. REv. 1164 (1966); Note, 52 CoRNELL L. Q. 149 (1966).
106 Owensby v. United States, 353 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
962 (1966); Clark v. Turner, 350 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1965); Lowther v. Maxwell, 347
F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel Konigsberg v. McFarland, 348 F.2d 215
(3rd Cir. 1965); Holland v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 52 (9th Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 868 (1965); Gailes v. Yeager, 324 F.2d 630 (3rd Cit. 1963); Patskan v. Buchkoe,
296 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1961); Roberts v. Pepersack, 286 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1960);
Sink v. Cox, 142 F.2d 917 (8th Cit. 1949); Seay v. Sanford, 158 F.2d 281 (5th Cit.
1946); Pope v. Huff, 141 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Petitions of Shekoski, 239 F.Supp.
996 (E. D. Mich. 1965).
107Wells v. California, 352 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1009 (1966); Hunter v. Smith, 249 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1957).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ness" branch of custody and could not invoke habeas corpus, as
he would no longer be serving or restrained by that sentence.108
To summarize, the McNally rule and its corollaries-prematurity,
mootness, and immediate release-generally have meant that habeas
corpus cannot be used to attack a sentence to be served in the future,
nor to attack a sentence fully served, nor to challenge one of two
concurrent sentences where one is conceded to be valid, and in many
instances it meant that a state prisoner had no remedy to challenge
an invalid sentence. 109
V
THE LEAD OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The traditional approach to the concept of custody, however, did
not go unchallenged. In a series of recent cases the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, departing from an earlier position consistent
with the tenets of McNally,'" seriously challenged and altered the con-
cept. Perhaps the appropriate starting point in a review of the con-
cept of custody in the Fourth Circuit is Jones v. Cunningham.1 Jones,
serving a sentence as a recidivist in a state prison, sought to attack by
federal habeas corpus one of the underlying convictions on constitu-
tional grounds. The writ was denied by the district court and after
the appeal had been granted by the Court of Appeals, Jones was re-
leased on parole. The Court of Appeals then denied the writ, saying:
In the nature of things, the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus ad sub-
jiciendum may issue only when the applicant is in the actual physical
custody of the person to whom the writ is directed .... The great
purpose of the writ is to afford a means for speedily testing the
legality of a present, physical detention of a person. It serves no other
purpose.112
108 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960); Morrison v. Heritage, 324 F.2d 698 (5th
Cir. 1963). But see Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946). There the petition
for certiorari was not dismissed as moot, even though the petitioner had fully served
the sentence, because the conviction subjected him to deportation if it involved a
crime of moral turpitude.
10 9 See note 127 infra.
110 Roberts v. Pepersack, 286 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1961); Whiting v. Chew, 273 F.2d
885 (4th Cir. 1960); Hunter v. Smith, 249 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1957).
111294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961). Cf. Hoptowit v. United States, 274 F.2d 936, 938
(9th Cir. 1966). [Parole merely an "extension of prison walls" for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).]
112 Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608, 609 (4th Cir. 1961). The Court of Appeals
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... From time to time petitioner must report to a parole officer and
he should not change his residence or his employment without the
prior or subsequent approval of that officer. Otherwise he is as free
as any other citizen to do as he pleases and go where he pleases. His
status is predominantly one of liberty.113
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals.1 4 Noting the restrictions and conditions imposed upon
petitioner by the parole, 15 Justice Black pointed out that the English
cases as well as those in the United States had not restricted the writ
to situations where there was actual physical custody.
History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical
imprisonment, there are other restaints on a man's liberty, restraints
not shared by the public generally, which have been thought suffi-
cient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas
corpus.
1 1 6
• ..It is not relevant that conditions and restrictions such as these
may be desirable and important parts of the rehabilitative process;
what matters is that they significantly restrain petitioner's liberty to
do those things which in this country free men are entitled to do.
Such restraints are enough to invoke the help of the Great Writ. Of
course, that writ always could and still can reach behind prison walls
and iron bars. But it can do more. It is not now and never has been
a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve
relied on Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1885), where the Court stated:
"To make a case for habeas corpus there must be actual confinement."
113 Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1961). Judge Sobeloff expressed
the view that completion of service of a sentence or being paroled did not end the
interest in contesting a conviction because society often imposed hardships on such
persons no less severe than imprisonment and stated: "[Where constitutional rights
have been violated, there should be standing to attack a conviction even though the
crime had been 'paid for." However, he considered as controlling Parker v. Ellis,
362 U.S. 574 (1960), which had held that habeas corpus became moot when the
petitioner's sentence expired. Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608, 612-13 (4th Cir.
1961). (Concurring opinion.)
l14Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); Note, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 228 (1963).
The opinion relied heavily on immigration and military induction cases. Jones, by
implication, overruled Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942), where a petition for a
writ of certiorari, from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, was denied for "moot-
ness" because the petitioner had been paroled and was no longer in control of the
warden.
115Justice Black noted that these conditions appeared to be the common ones im-
posed by parole. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 n. 20 (1963).
11 Id. at 240.
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its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of
their rights to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.
While petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical im-
prisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and
restrain his freedom; that is enough to keep him in custody... with-
in the meaning of the habeas corpus statute .... 17
Jones v. Cunningham was taken by the Fourth Circuit as a signal in
succeeding cases for a basic departure from the conventional approach
to custody. The first of these cases, Thomas v. Cunningham,"8 received
very little notice, although it basically departed from the whole con-
cept of custody."9 Nathan Thomas had been convicted in a state court
upon pleas of guilty, all made at the same time, to six felonies and
received sentences totaling twelve years, two on each indictment. Sev-
eral months later, Thomas again pleaded guilty in a different state
court to another indictment and was sentenced to an additional five
years. Thomas, by a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Supp. 1968) in the district court, challenged all of these sentences
on constitutional grounds. When the petition was filed, Thomas was
serving the last of the six two-year sentences. However, by the time
the district court had held a plenary hearing, but before entering an
order requiring petitioner's release, 2 ' Thomas had fully served the
six two-year sentences. Thus, when the appeal came to the court of
appeals, the six sentences were fully served and under the traditional
"present restraint" requirement were moot.12' Thomas was then serving
17 Id. at 242-43.
118 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964). The Ninth Circuit also viewed Jones as a sign for
a liberal approach and suggested that a petitioner on probation was in "custody"
for purposes of habeas corpus. Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
119 Curiously, the Fourth Circuit did not even cite Thomas in subsequent cases.
See Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967); Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115
(4th Cir. 1966); Martin v. Commonwealth, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965). But it did
rely on it in Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cit. 1967). Perhaps the court felt
that Thomas was limited by the particular facts.
12 The district court had entered an order that petitioner be released "unless the
State within sixty days elects to re-try him or perfects its appeal." 335 F.2d at 68.
Such an order is typical where petitioner had been successful in the proceeding but
is hardly consistent with the notion that only "immediate release" can be given by
habeas corpus. However, it is only fair that the state should be given a reasonable
opportunity to re-try the prisoner. See R. SOKoL, A HANDBOOK OF FaEaAr H.AB&-s
Coapus, 83-4 (1965). See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Ex parte Miled-
ley, 134 U.S. 160, 173 (1890).
'
2 1 See text p. 19 supra. It should be noted that when Thomas filed the petition,
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the five-year sentence which had been a "future sentence" at the time
the petition was filed and under the traditional McNally rule could
not have been attacked by habeas corpus. 12  In meeting the mootness
question, the court in a per curiam opinion said:
The ratio decidendi of Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct.
373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) suggests that jurisdiction of the District
Court to adjudicate the validity of the Buchanan [six] sentences sur-
vived by the expiration of their imprisonment of him.... With this
greater breadth accorded the writ, we do not think, certainly in the
present circumstances, Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.
Ed.2d 963 (1960) would be a bar. The review should comprehend not
only the last but all the Buchanan [six] sentences. The entire sequence
of them was passed at the same time and each was infected with the
same infirmity.123
As to the five-year Dickenson sentence, the opinion adverted to the
prematurity problem but without discussion held "the instant case ripe
for a declaration" that the judgment was patently void. 2 4
In many respects Thomas is classic in highlighting the harsh results
of the traditional approach to the requirement of custody. Assume, for
example, that Thomas had at one point received two one-year sentences
to be served consecutively and that both of these convictions were in-
valid under Gideon; 5 subsequent to this he received another one-year
sentence, also invalid, to be served after the expiration of sentences
one and two. If Thomas while serving sentence number one filed a
writ challenging all three sentences, it would have been "premature"
as to number two and three, and if number one were fully served be-
fore there was a plenary hearing and the case disposed of, the case
would have been moot as to sentence number one. 2 " This mootness,
four of the sentences had been fully served. It might be contended, as urged by
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Parker v. Ellis, 352 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), that
jurisdiction attached at the time the petition was filed attacking a present sentence
and was not lost when the sentence was fully served. But would this explain attack
as to those served prior to filing of the petition?
122 See text p. 18, et seq., supra.
123Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67, 68-9 (4th Cir. 1964).
124ld. at 69.
325 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
126Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). There a petition for a writ of certiorari
had been granted to review dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus. However,
before the case was heard, the petitioner was released and the case dismissed as
moot. However, as pointed out, Parker v. Ellis was overruled by Carafas v. LaValee,
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as recognized by the court in Thomas, may have been due to no fault
of the petitioner but to court congestion or other factors, and there
may have been no other remedy to challenge the fully-served sen-
tence.1 7 There could have been the same result if the petition had
been filed while sentence number two was being served. Number one
would have been moot and no longer a cause of restraint; number
three would have been premature; and number two could have been
fully served and become moot before the case was heard. If the petition
had been filed during service of the third sentence, the challenge to
the first two would have been moot, and the third could have become
moot before a decision was made. Apparently recognizing that such a
a result could leave a prisoner serving a series of consecutive short-
term sentences almost without a remedy to attack patently invalid sen-
tences, the Fourth Circuit felt compelled to depart from the tradi-
tional view.12 8 This justification does not seem to cover the five-year
sentence which was a "future" sentence when the petition was filed,
although there was present restraint under the five-year sentence when
the question reached the court of appeals.
In final analysis the court held that fully-served sentences relating to
the identical constitutionally defective trial as the sentence being served
at the time the petition is filed may be reached by habeas corpus, even
though all sentences may be fully served before final disposition, and
that a future sentence may be questioned if it becomes a present re-
straint prior to disposition of the case.2 9
391 U.S. 234 (1968), and this result would no longer obtain. See text p. 36 infra.
127 Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1964). In some instances there
may have been other remedies available-such as coram nobis, motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1964) for federal prisoners. But in many instances, particularly for state pris-
oners, there was no other means of redress available. For discussion of alternate
remedies, see Note, Habeas Corpus and the Prematurity Rule, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1164
(1966); Note, Habeas Corpus and Prematurity, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 149 (1966); Note,
Federal Habeas Corpus-The Search for a Solution to the Prematurity Concept, 1
VAL. U. L. REV. 155 (1966); Note, Habeas Corpus, Custody, and Declaratory Judg-
ment, 54 VA. L. REv. 673 (1967). In several of the cases where the United
States Supreme Court invoked "prematurity," it suggested an alternate remedy. Heflin
v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 (1959) (a § 2255 proceeding; the Court suggested
Fed. R. Crim. p. 35); Holiday v. Johnson, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941) (apply for va-
cation of sentence); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 141 (1934) (mandamus).
128 The court may have felt justified by the facts in the Thomas case. Thomas had
initially filed a petition for habeas corpus in a state court while serving the fourth
of his two-year terms, but by the time he had "exhausted" his state remedy and re-
ceived a hearing on his federal petition, he had served the remaining two terms.
129 The court did not cast its holding in these terms and gave no rationale for
allowing challenge of the future sentence beyond stating that it was "ripe." An ap-
[Vol. 4:1
HABEAS CORPUS
Shortly after Thomas, the Fourth Circuit took another look at the
custody requirement in Martin v. Commonwealth. James Edward
Martin, serving a fifteen-year sentence for murder, escaped from prison
and as a result was sentenced to a five-year term for escape and to a
three-year term for grand larceny committed during the escape. These
sentences were to begin at the expiration of the fifteen-year sentence.
While still serving the murder sentence, Martin filed a petition for
habeas corpus, alleging that the escape and larceny convictions were
constitutionally defective and that because of these convictions his
eligibility for parole on the murder sentence had been deferred."-' The
state court denied the writ, apparently on the basis of McNally v.
Hill,132 and said that habeas corpus could only be used to attack a sen-
tence presently being served. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia denied a petition for a writ of error. Martin then filed a "Mo-
tion for Declaratory Judgment" in the federal district court, making
essentially the same allegations. The district court denied the motion
on the ground that "the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide
a substitute for habeas corpus or other collateral appeal." 13 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit treated the motion as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and dealt with the McNally prematurity problem.
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held that a sentence which
the prisoner had not begun to serve did not satisfy the statutory
requirement of "custody" even though a result of the challenged sen-
tence was to thwart his eligibility for parole. McNally v. Hill....
If this decision stood alone, unqualified by later decisions of the
Supreme Court, we as a lower court would be bound to fol-
low it. Since then, however, the Court has relaxed the strictness of
this interpretation and held that one on parole is in "custody" within
the meaning of the term as used in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. Jones v. Cun-
proach that would allow for attack of future sentences, if they became a present
restraint prior to disposition of the case, would be difficult to apply. How could a
court anticipate which sentences might become "presently served"? Would it invite
early disposition as "premature" or delay for "ripening"? The hazards of delay would
be present in either event. In later cases the court developed a rationale which offers
a workable approach.
13o 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
131 Originally Martin would have been eligible for parole in 1963. However, the
subsequent sentences for escape and larceny delayed his eligibility for parole until
1966. Thus Martin's situation and argument were indistinguishable from that in Mc-
Nallyv. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
132 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
183 Martin v. Commonwealth, 349 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1965).
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ningbam, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). Still
later, the Court, in broad terms, equated "custody" with "restraint
of liberty." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed.2d
837 (1963).
In light of these progressively developing notions as to the scope of
the writ of habeas corpus, there is reasonable ground for thinking
that were the Supreme Court faced with the issue today, it might
well reconsider McNally and hold that a denial of eligibility for
parole is a "restraint of liberty" no less substantial than the technical
restraint of parole .... We therefore hold, in keeping with the spirit
of these developments, that because Martin's escape and larceny con-
victions bar his eligibility for parole, he is "in custody" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241.134
In the opinion Judge Sobeloff went farther and suggested that the
Martin approach would not be "limited to one such as Martin who is
able to state a strong case for parole consideration." 135
The significance of Martin was quickly noticed136 and its lead fol-
lowed in other cases. 37 In Commonwealth ex rel Stevens v. Myers13
perhaps one of the best opinions to date on prematurity, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of prematurity and over-
ruled a long line of authority holding that the writ of habeas corpus
could be used only to test the legality of present restraint. 39 The Penn-
sylvania court regarded McNally, defining the role of the federal writ,
as not binding upon the state court. The court considered that in view
of the great development of the writ as an instrument of post-conviction
litigation and in "face of the present urgent necessity for a state post-
conviction avenue which will afford an adequate corrective process for
hearing and determining alleged violations of federal constitutional
guarantees," 140 it would be detrimental to carry over from the his-
'34 Id. at 783-84.
135 Id. at 784.
136 Note, 46 B.U. L. REv. 269 (1966); 1966 DUxE L. J. 588; 54 GEO. L. J. 1004 (1966):
44 N.C. L. REv. 824 (1966).
137 Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Boseant v. Fitzharris, 370 F.2d
105 (9th Cir. 1966) (state prisoner could use habeas corpus to challenge second il-
legal sentence which had effect of revoking parole on first valid sentence); State
ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d 161 (1965); State v. Losieau, 180
Neb. 696, 144 N.W.2d 435 (1966).
138 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965).
139 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Ashe, 335 Pa. 575, 7 A.2d 296 (1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 596 (1939).
140 The court pointed out, however, that it was not dealing with the "mootness"
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torical uses of the writ the prematurity concept. Particularly compelling
to the court was the large number of convictions potentially voidable
by means of habeas corpus because of recent constitutional decisions
and the consequent retrials which would be necessary. The prematurity
concept would only compound the problems due to delay upon re-
trial. The Court said:
The prematurity concept as applied to petitions collaterally attacking
convictions only aggravates these already acute problems. In return
for its serious disadvantages, the concept has little to recommend it
except the historical lineage of the writ as used in other instances.
We do not believe that mere historical considerations, now outdis-
tanced by modem conditions, should be allowed to control the scope
of a writ which in this state is clearly adaptable to the exigencies of
the times when the writ is used in a new class of cases .... Although
steeped in tradition, the writ is not insensitive to change. Since the
writ has developed as a means of collateral, post-conviction attack,
the prerequisites for permitting its use should be adjusted so that
the writ may effectively perform that role. Our present judgment
must be based on today's needs which the writ is capable of meeting
in satisfying the present demands of justice.141
Soon after Martin, the Fourth Circuit took another step and struck
at the "mootness" barrier to use of habeas corpus in Tucker v. Pey-
ton.142 Tucker, a state prisoner, attacked as invalid a sentence which
had already been served but did not challenge the sentences he was
aspect of custody. Commonwealth ex reL Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 5 n. 7, 213
A.2d 613, 616 n. 7 (1965).
141d. at 16, 213 A.2d at 622. Soon thereafter the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
in a very brief opinion citing Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers held that the
restraint of a prisoner under a valid sentence was no valid reason for denying the
writ by which petitioner sought to attack a prior sentence from which he bad been
"reparoled.' Commonwealth ex reL Alexander v. Rundle, 206 Pa. Super. 528, 213 A.2d
645 (1965). (Apparently this meant released on parole on first sentence to begin service
on second sentence.) Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), would suggest that
parole was sufficient restraint for custody, but yet even if voided, Alexander would not
have been entitled to his immediate release and it is difficult to see how there was
any restraint, except in the Martin sense of affecting right to parole under the valid
sentence being served. The brief facts do not indicate if this were true. A supple-
mentary opinion reported in Commonwealth ex rel. Alexander v. Rundle, 206 Pa.
Super. 528, 214 A.2d 304 (1965) indicates that the court considered the sentence un-
der attack either a future sentence as in Stevens or in effect a concurrent sentence.
142 357 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1966). Cf. Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402, 405 (9th
Cir. 1962).
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then serving. The Court of Appeals held that the validity of the fully-
served sentence could be questioned by habeas corpus on the theory
that if the earlier sentence were invalid, the commencement of service
of the subsequent sentences would be advanced and the petitioner
would have served sufficient time to have fully served the subsequent
valid sentences and would be entitled to immediate release. However,
the court put limits on this approach by pointing out that the valid
sentence could not be moved back beyond the date on which the
sentence had been imposed. Thus, the court spoke, at least partially, to
the question of mootness in allowing a fully-served sentence to be
challenged.'43
In early 1967 the Fourth Circuit spoke again on the Martin prob-
lem in Williams v. Peyton.4 4 Williams, a multiple offender, in his peti-
tion for a federal writ of habeas corpus, challenged certain future
sentences. At the time of filing the petition, he was eligible for parole
on his aggregate sentences, but did not contest the validity of the sen-
tence he was then serving. The court held that habeas corpus was ap-
propriate to challenge the future sentences where the petitioner's
chances for parole were manifestly restricted by these future sentences,
allegedly invalid. The court said:
Williams is eligible for consideration for parole at this time, but we
would be blind to the practicalities of the matter if we were to con-
clude that the likelihood of his being paroled is not more remote when
the records show that he has been convicted six times and sentenced
to an aggregate of nineteen years, 33 1/3% of which has been served,
than if they were to show that he had been convicted twice and
sentenced to a term of seven years, 60% of which has been served.
The weight to be afforded these factors is a matter for a parole
board. It is, of course, true that the parole board may conclude that
Williams should not be paroled, even if his 1956 convictions [future
143 The rationale of Tucker would be limited by the amount of time served on the
invalid sentence which might be credited on the valid sentence. Allowing credit for
time served on an invalid sentence runs into the argument on "banking", i.e., serving
"time" before the crime or subsequent trial, receiving credit and then in effect
being able to commit a crime with impunity. Cf. A.BA. STANDARDs, SENTENCING
ALTERNATWvES AND PRocEmus S 3.6 (Tent. Draft Dec., 1967). In any event, if any
credit could be given on the valid sentence, this should be enough detriment flowing
from the invalid sentence to be considered restraint under the approach suggested
by later decisions of the Fourth Circuit. See also Capetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1969).
144 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
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sentences] are set aside and he is not retried, but we must conclude
thar the number of convictions and aggregate sentences are factors
which every parole board probably considers in regard to any pris-
oner seeking parole, and we cannot expect that the parole board has
either the jurisdiction or the authority to inquire into the correct-
ness of any conviction. . . . In Martin we had no assurance that the
prisoner would be paroled if his subsequent convictions were found
invalid and set aside. The mere possibility that Martin's chances for
obtaining some limited form of freedom more rapidly was enough
to persuade us to allow the challenge. The same factor motivates us
here.
We conclude, therefore, as we did in Martin that the presence of
other convictions may be a real effective basis of appellant's con-
tinning detention in a penal institution instead of being at large,
relatively free, even though under parole supervision. . . . That such
a possibiilty is enough to warrant availability of the writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the validity of the future [convictions] has
been recognized in other cases.... Appellant is, we conclude, "in cus-
tody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241.1-5
A logical extension of the rationale of Williams in cases of mootness
where the sentence has already been served would suggest an alternate
basis for a Tucker situation and allow attack on such sentences, if the
prisoner were presently eligible for parole, as they undoubtedly are
considered by parole boards in their decisions. If such past-served con-
victions are invalid, they may have as much restraining effect on chances
for parole as did the future ones in Williams. Martin would also suggest
that if voiding the past sentence would mean that the date of eligi-
bility for parole would be advanced so that the prisoner is now eligible,
he would have standing to challenge the past-served sentence. But what
of the situations where avoidance of the future or past sentence would
not mean an advancement of the date of eligibility for parole and would
consequently have no present effect on chances for parole?146
In August, 1967, the Fourth Circuit again struck at the prematurity
145 Id. at 220. In support of this the court cited State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 272
Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d 161 (1965), and State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 144 N.W.2d
435 (1966). See also United States ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir.
1962); United States ex tel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
140At the present the Fourth Circuit has not extended the Martin and Williams
rationale to fully served sentences, allegedly void, although Thomas might be ex-
plainable on that basis-that is, the past sentences affecting either date of eligibility
for parole or chances for parole. The same could be said of the future sentence in
Thomas. However, the opinion in Thomas did not rest the decision on that basis.
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concept and went beyond the limiting rationale of "present effect on
parole" advanced in Martin and Williams. In Rowe v. Peyton 47 and its
companion case, Thacker v. Peyton, the court was asked to
... decide whether or not any remedy is available to state prisoners
seeking to attack on constitutional grounds state sentences to be
served in the future which have no present effect upon consideration
for parole. We think that the traditional writ of habeas corpus is
available to serve the clearly present need of a procedural device to
test the legality of these convictions under the Constitution of the
United StatesY.48
Rowe, serving a thirty-year sentence to be followed by another
twenty-year sentence, was not eligible for parole until 1975. By his
petition he contested only the second sentence on constitutional
grounds. Invalidation of this second sentence would have advanced
Rowe's eligibility for parole to 1970 or 1971. Thacker also sought to
attack future sentences to begin service in 1944, although his eligi-
bility for parole in 1976 would not be advanced by voiding the future
sentences. The court, relying on Williams v. Peyton,149 stated that
both Rowe and Thacker would be able to attack the future sentences,
once eligible for parole, and considered the fundamental question to be
whether they must "patiently wait until the challenged convictions
begin to hurt them in terms of an immediate potential parole. The
answer involves a more fundamental question, whether the courts are
powerless to provide an effective remedy to vacate constitutionally
defective convictions at a time when witnesses are available and their
memories relatively fresh, when it is certain that, if the prisoner sur-
vives so long, there will be an available remedy some years hence." 150
In answering this question, the court of appeals considered the his-
tory of the writ, as had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Stevens v.
Myers,151 the change in the nature of the writ brought about by such
cases as Brown v. Allen152 and Fay v. Noia,5 3 the expansion of due
process and equal protection, and concluded that habeas corpus should
147 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
148 Id. at 710.
149 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967). See also text p. 30 supra.
150 Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1967).
151419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965). See also text p. 28 supra.
152 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
153372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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afford such a remedy. The court considered the liberal, less technical
concept of the writ as exemplified by Jones v. Cunningbam54 and Fay
v. Noia'r5 to be thoroughly inconsistent with the narrow technical ap-
proach of McNally, and therefore felt free to disregard McNally as
no longer controlling and to go beyond the strict limits of Williams
and Martin, which were based on the immediate inhibiting effect upon
the petitioner's chances of obtaining conditional release on parole. 5 6 It
was clear to the court that delay due to the prematurity concept would
be detrimental not only to prisoners but also to the interests of the
state. The court concluded "that the writ is available to attack any
sentence, service of which will be required in the future by the same
custodian who presently detains the prisoner." 157
A somewhat ironic twist to the impact of Jones v. Cunningham'5 s
was used in United States ex rel Chilcote v. Maroney.'59 Chilcote, while
serving a valid state sentence, sought to attack a prior sentence, al-
legedly void, on the basis that his right to apply for state parole had
been abridged by the earlier illegal sentences. Although it is not clear
from the opinion, apparently Chilcote had been "reparoled" or "con-
structively paroled" from the allegedly invalid earlier sentences to be-
gin service of the valid sentence. 60 Jones v. Cunninghan 61 then would
suggest that Chilcote was in custody under the "reparoled" sentences. 2
However, the court took the position that under McNally v. Hill the
only relief available by habeas corpus was immediate release and denied
the writ. The court reasoned that even if the earlier sentences were
voided, Chilcote would still be held under the valid sentence and
even though he might be paroled from the valid sentence, this
154 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
155 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
'
5 6 Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 714-15 (4th Cir. 1967).
157ld. at 717. The court said: 'In a technical sense each of the prisoners here is
presently serving only one of the sentences imposed to run consecutively, but in a
substantive and practical sense Rowe is serving a total commitment of 50 years and
Thacker one of more than sixty-four." Id.
158 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
159 246 F. Supp. 607 (W.D.Pa. 1965).
160 For discussion of Pennsylvania's "reparole" and "constructive" parole, see Com-
monwealth ex rel. Alexander v. Rundle, 206 Pa. Super. 528, 529 n. 2, 214 A.2d 305,
305 n. 2 (1965). See also note 141 supra.
101 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
162The court seemed to acknowledge this fact United States ex rel. Chilcote v.
Maroney, 246 F. Supp. 607, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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would not be immediate release because parole was restraint or cus-
tody by Jones v. Cunningham. Under this approach in a Martin or
Williams type situation,163 where the only effect of setting aside in-
valid convictions would be to improve the possibility for parole, the
writ would not be available for even if parole were granted, this
would not be "immediate release" because parole is still restraint accord-
ing to Jones -u. Cunningham. 163a
One other recent case in the Fourth Circuit seems significant in assess-
ing that court's approach to custody. In Landman v. Peyton' Land-
man, a "writ writer" and "agitator," while serving a sentence for rob-
bery in a state prison, apparently filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, 6 5 attacking his confinement in the maximum security section
of the penitentiary and petitioned for restoration to the general prison
population. He alleged that the maximum security confinement was
due to his having instituted certain legal proceedings. 166 The federal
district court had afforded a full evidentiary hearing, and the court
of appeals considered the merits of the claim but did not discuss
whether the type or degree of restraint, imposed on a sentence which
itself was not challenged, could appropriately be raised on habeas cor-
pus. The impact of the case is that it allows the degree or type of
restraint to be raised and examined on habeas corpus even though the
underlying conviction is not challenged and even though there would
be no right to "immediate" release from all confinement. 6
7
163 See text p. 27, 30 supra.
163aUnder Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968), discussed p. 36 infra,
the holding in Cbilcote v. Maroney would clearly be erroneous.
164 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
165 It is not clear from the opinion whether the petition was for a writ of habeas
corpus or that the court treated it as such. By an amended petition, Landman did re-
quest release from all confinement. Id. at 137. Cf. Martin v. Commonwealth, 349 F.2d
781 (4th Cir. 1965), where the court treated a petition for declaratory judgment as
a petition for habeas corpus.
166 Landman also alleged that he was "denied unhampered access to the courts in
violation of his constitutional rights." Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 137 (4th
Cir. 1966).
167 See Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), revd on other
grounds, 382 F. 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). There habeas corpus
was used to challenge a prisoner's custody in solitary confinement, although he could
not be released from total confinement. See also United States v. Hart, 409 F.2d 22 (4th
Cir. 1969). There a prisoner was permitted to question by habeas corpus an alleged
denial of medical attention, and punishment allegedly due to request for stationery




THE RESPONSE OF THE SUPREME COURT:
THE "GREAT W UT" Is RELEASED FROM CUSTODY
The Fourth Circuit in some of its decisions had practically pleaded
for review of the concept of custody by the Supreme Court, and near
the end of the 1968 term the Court spoke in Walker v. Wainwright,68
Peyton v. Rowe 69 and Carafas v. LaVallee.7 0
In March, 1968, in a brief, per curiam opinion in Walker v. Wain-
'wright, the Court clearly repudiated the "immediate release" branch
of custody. Walker had been convicted in a state court of first
degree murder and received a life sentence. Subsequently, he received
a five-year sentence on an assault conviction, to begin service upon
completion of the murder sentence. By a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, he challenged the murder conviction on constitutional grounds.
Relying on McNally v. Hill, the district court denied the writ, reason-
ing that even a favorable decision on the murder conviction would
not result in Walker's immediate release from prison. The court of
appeals had summarily denied Walker's application for a certificate
of probable cause. In holding that the writ was available, the Supreme
Court said: "Here the District Court has turned that doctrine [Mc-
Nally] inside out by telling the petitioner that he cannot attack the
life sentence he has begun to serve-until after he has finished serving
it. . . . Whatever the other function, the great and central office of
the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current
detention." 171
The Court has thus apparently said, without any limitation, that
any sentence presently being served may be challenged without regard
to whether a successful challenge would lead to immediate release. It
is significant that the Court did not require a showing that a successful
attack, by a credit of time served on the invalid sentence to the valid
sentence, would entitle the petitioner to immediate release.'72
168 390 U.S. 335 (1968).
169 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
170 391 US. 234 (1968).
17 Walker v. Wainwright, 390 US. 335, 336 (1968).
172 From the facts given in the opinion, it is not clear that the Court's characterza,-
tion of the district court action is necessarily accurate, i.e., that the life sentence
had to be fully served before it could be attacked. The district court, by analogy to
those cases requiring service of all valid time before allowing attack of the invalid,
may have been saying that sufficient time had not been served on the life sentence
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By May, 1968, the "prematurity" outgrowth of McNally had reached
its maturity when the Court reviewed Rowe-Thacker in Peyton v.
Rowe.'73 In an unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Warren, McNally
was overruled: "We conclude that the decision in that case was com-
pelled neither by statute nor by history and that today it represents
an indefensible barrier to prompt adjudication of constitutional claims
in federal courts." 174
On the same day that McNally was overruled, the Court in Carafas
v. LaVallee7 5 decided what perhaps may be the most significant deci-
sion to date dealing with custody and the doctrine of "mootness." Ca-
rafas is another classic example of the dissent of yesterday becoming
the majority of today when the Court unanimously accepted W/ar-
ren's dissent in Parker v. Ellis76 and overruled the majority opinion in
that case. Carafas, by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in a
federal district court, challenged on constitutional grounds a sentence
he was then serving. However, by the time the denial of the writ was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, Carafas had been uncondi-
tionally released from custody.'7 7 The question squarely faced by the
Court was "whether the expiration of petitioner's sentence before his
application was finally adjudicated and while it was waiting appellate
review terminates federal jurisdiction with respect to the applica-
tion." '17 The Court answered this by saying: "[W]e conclude that
under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached
in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner
which, if "credited" on the five-year sentence, would entitle Walker to immediate
release. Cf. Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1966); Capetta v. Wainwright,
406 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1969). In any event, the holding of the Court seems desirable.
As previously noted, requiring service on the present invalid sentence equal to the
valid future sentence before allowing habeas attack would in most instances, because
of almost unavoidable delay, mean service of more time than had validly been given.
Also, it would result in delay in the plenary hearing with its consequent hazards of
loss of evidence and staleness.
17-3 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
'74 Id. at 55.
175 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
176 362 U.S. 574 (1960). See text p. 24 and note 121 supra.
177The petitioner had applied for the writ in June, 1963, and in October, 1964,
had been paroled. On March 6, 1967, upon expiration of his sentence, he had been
discharged from parole status. The writ of certiorai was ganted by the Supreme Court
on October 16, 1967. And even by Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), Carafas
was no longer in "custody".
178 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).
[Vol. 4:1
HABEAS CORPUS
prior to completion of proceedings on such application." "' The Court
further stated:
It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In consequence of his
conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve
as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he can-
not vote in any election held in New York State; he cannot serve
as a juror. Because of these disabilities or burdens [which] may flow
from petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the judgment
of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed
on him." . . . On account of these "collateral consequences" the case
is not moot. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633-634, n. 2
(1968) .... 180
Significantly, the Court also stressed the fact that relief under the
writ is not limited to discharge from physical custody.""1
After Walker, Rowe and Carafas, what remains of the concept of cus-
tody? Clearly, the "prematurity" and "immediate release" aspects have
been repudiated and, at least partially, the "mootness" doctrine. May
the writ be invoked to challenge any past, present, or future sen-
tence; are there limits or should there be some limits on its use? Of
course, at present the statutory requirement that the "writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody
. . ., presents a barrier. The real question unresolved for the fu-
ture, but brought into focus by the opinion in Carafas v. LaVallee and
by the recent opinions in Ginsberg v. New York'8 and Sibron v.
New York,18 4 is whether the federal writ will be extended to the
179Id. at 238-39.
,s0 Id. at 237-38.
181 Id. at 239. The statute presently provides that a court may grant "release from
custody or other remedy." 28 U.S.CA. § 2244 (b) (Supp. 1967).
182 28 U.S.C.A.A§ 2241 (c) (1964).
183 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Sam Ginsberg had been convicted in a state court of
selling obscene material to a minor and had received a suspended sentence which
could have been revoked and sentence imposed only within a year. The year had
passed before the appeal from the state conviction reached the United States Supreme
Court. The Court rejected the contention that the case was thereby moot, relying
on the fact that further penalties or disabilities-e.g., ineligibility for certain state or
municipal licenses-could be imposed as a result of the judgment.
184 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron had completed service of a six-month sentence prior
to the time his appeal from the state conviction reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 50,
n. 8. The Court in holding that the case was not moot said: "St. Pierre v. United States
[319 U.S. 41 (1943)] must be read in light of later cases to mean that a criminal case
is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal conse'-
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truly "moot" sentence or conviction, i.e., one which has been fully
served at the time the petition for the writ is filed as in Thomas v. Cun-
ningham.18 5 To ask the question another way, if civil legal disabilities
and disqualifications resulting from a conviction are such restraints not
shared by other free men as to sustain jurisdiction and to prevent a chal-
lenge from becoming moot once the sentence is fully served, should this
be sufficient restraint or "custody" to initiate use of the writ? Are not
the "collateral legal consequences" flowing from the invalid conviction
the same whether the writ is requested before or after an unconditional
release? Are these disabilities sufficient to justify use of judicial and legal
resources and to insure the necessary adverseness and controversy?
Carafras, Ginsberg and Sibron indicate a concern by the Court with
the problem of insuring the constitutional integrity of proceedings
which may be of "low visibility" because of lack of an adequate op-
portunity for state or federal review.18 6 As the Court noted, this may
be due to the impact of mootness where the sentence is fully served
because of its short duration or the time required to exhaust state
remedies. Yet there may be lasting collateral legal consequences at-
tached to such convictions or proceedings. Should the Court in the
future in some manner avoid the barrier imposed by the statutory re-
quirement of custody and allow federal habeas corpus for state pris-
oners8 7 in such moot cases, many other problems would be presented.
Does the requirement of "custody," at least in the sense of some type
of physical restraint or control, e.g. parole, serve the important func-
tion of designating who is a proper party to respond to the demand of
the writ to justify the constitutional validity of the cause of
restraint? Is the voter qualification board of New York a proper
quences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Id. at 57. The
Court implied that it had already held in Pollard v. United States, 372 U.S. 354 (1957)
that such "collateral consequences" would be presumed, consonant with "the obvious
fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal
consequences." Id. at 55.
185 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964). See text p. 24 supra.
186 In Sibron the Court said: "Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are
encountered primarily at a level of 'low visibility' in the criminal process-in the
context of prosecutions for 'minor' offenses which carry only short sentences. We do
not believe that the Constitution contemplates that people deprived of constitutional
rights at this level should be left utterly remediless and defenseless against repetitions
of unconstitutional conduct." 392 U.S. at 52-3.
187 For federal convictions in this area of mootness, a remedy seems to exist in the
form of the writ of coraim nobis by which fully served sentences may be challenged.
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). Cf. Mathis v. United States,
369 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1966).
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party to respond to such a demand to justify an Arizona con-
viction already served?"' Procedurally, could and should the state
of Arizona be required to respond in a federal district court in New
York if New York asserts voter disqualification based on a prior Ari-
zona conviction, or could the writ be brought in Arizona? The recent
opinions by the Court do not answer these questions, and it is, of
course, difficult to anticipate how far and in what manner the Court
will move in the future. In trying to resolve some of these questions.
and to determine if there is a sound rationale underlying the recent
changes in the custody requirements, a look at the groundwork laic
by the Fourth Circuit may be helpful in assessing the soundness of
the Court's decisions and what the future course should be. The Fourth
Circuit has suggested an outline for an approach which is compatible
with the recent changes in custody, covers some of the areas of obvious
concern to the Court and suggests solutions to some of the unanswered
questions.
Vii
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
Until removed or by-passed in some manner, the statutes granting
jurisdiction to the federal courts and the requirement of custody im-
pose certain limits on federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners. 18
Even under the liberal approach charted by the Fourth Circuit, which
seems to equate custody with any type of "restraint not shared by
other free men," there are limitations. From the series of decisions in'
the Fourth Circuit discussed above in Part V, is there a discernible
"theory" or developing concept of custody and what are its limita-
tions? How would it operate in the case of multiple offenders? With
188 Perhaps a part of the problem here is in the "collateral legal disqualifications'"
themselves. A re-examination of the relationship between the specific disqualifications
and the crime might be very beneficial in removing some of these "consequences."
189 For the relevant statute, see note 94 supra. Conceivably the Court could bypass,
the statute by holding that there is a constitutional right to habeas corpus and that-
its nature is such that it cannot be restricted by "custody." See note 73 supra. This
of course would bring into question the validity of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869) and Ex parte Bolman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), and whether
Congress could "suspend" the writ by restricting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. This was a latent question in the proposed amendments made in Congress
in 1968 to Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill, to remove federal court jurisdiction
to grant habeas corpus to state prisoners. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. 10,.
63-6, 233-48 (1968).
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the many varying factual situations in which either prematurity, moot-
ness or immediate release may be involved, it is clear that in the cases
decided in the Fourth Circuit all of the variations have not been con-
sidered. It is submitted, however, that the cases and their logical ex-
tension do present a sound and workable approach to custody for fed-
eral habeas corpus for state prisoners. Such an approach eliminates the
greatest hazards of prematurity, the loss of evidence due to delay in
holding the plenary hearing, and provides for a reasonable, limited ap-
proach to mootness.
First, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit has rejected any requirement
of "immediate release" 100 as shown by Martin, Williams and Rowe-
Thacker. The gist of the approach suggested by the Fourth Circuit is
this: If the sentence under attack, whether fully served' 9' or to be
served in the future, may affect the date of eligibility for parole or the
chances for parole,1 92 whether the defendant is presently eligible for
parole or not, then habeas corpus may be used. Rowe-Thacker 93 sug-
gests that even though the present or past sentences, if avoided, would
not make petitioner presently eligible for parole and thus not pres-
ently affect chances for parole, if there is certainty that petitioner in
the future may attack the sentence, then the hazards of delay and the
need for early finality are overriding, and attack by habeas corpus
should be allowed now. Under this approach if there is some present
restraint or legal detriment not shared by other free men attributable
to the invalid sentence, then the writ should be available. 9
4
190 The immediate release approach focused on the relief to be granted rather than
the nature of the restraint. It is not compelled by the statute which provides: "The
court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964). Frequently, even if the petitioner
is successful, there will be no immediate release, but the state will be given a reason-
able time to re-try the prisoner. See, e.g., the order in Thomas v. Cunningham, 335
F.2d 67, 68 (4th Cir. 1964), discussed in note 120 supra. Relief other than immediate
release may be obtained by habeas corpus. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.
1966). See note 167 supra.
191 Tucker v. Peyton, 357 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1966).
192 Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Commonwealth,
349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
193 Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). For convenience, Rowe-Thacker
will be used to designate the Fourth Circuit opinion and Peyton v. Rowe for the
Supreme Court decision.
194The Rowe-Tbacker situation, where there is no present effect on parole, is the
most difficult to deal with under the Fourth Circuit approach. In Rowe-Thacker, rely-
ing on Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964), the court said that in
effect the petitioners were presently serving all of the sentences for which they
were held, treating all of the sentences as one. This is also the approach suggested
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Perhaps the best way to evaluate the approach charted by the Fourth
Circuit is to examine its impact on a state prisoner who, much as in
Thomas, has been convicted of several crimes. First, how would the
approach work in the case of a fully-served sentence? Under the limits
of this theory, once served, until the one-time offender is again con-
victed, he would not be able to challenge the prior sentence. Until then,
challenges to the fully-served sentence, although it may have a restrain-
ing effect on employment and carry with it social stigma, can really
be considered moot.'95 Upon receiving a subsequent conviction, the
prisoner could then challenge the past sentence because of its effect on
his chances of parole, as in Williams.96 It should be noted that
if the writ is then made available, but not during the interim prior to
a subsequent conviction, relief will have been delayed and with it the
consequent potential loss of evidence. However, this result may be
justified. Under the traditional application of custody, once served, the
sentence could not thereafter have been challeged by habeas corpus.1 7
by the A.B.A. SrAawAgis, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AN PRoCEDuREs, § 3.4(c) (Tent.
Draft Dec, 1967), which provides: "(c) Corrections and parole authorities should be
directed to consider an offender committed under multiple sentences as though he
had been committed for a single term, the limits of which were defined by the
cumulative effect of the multiple sentences." The comment to this section acknowl-
edges "that subsection (c) could perhaps be interpreted to eliminate in some con-
texts the question of whether an offender is in custody under the sentence he wants
to challenge by habeas corpus. Such an effect would be desirable." Id. at 181. The
Court in Peyton v. Rowe accepted this view and said: "Nothing on the face of §
2241 militates against an interpretation which views Rowe and Thacker as being
'in custody' under the aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed on them. Un-
der that interpretation, they are 'in custody in violation of the Constitution' if any
consecutive sentence they are scheduled to serve was imposed as the result of a
deprivation of constitutional rights." 391 U.S. at 64-5. Is the Court suggesting a
prisoner is also in "custody" under a past, as well as future, consecutive sentence?
'
9 5 But see the views of Judge Sobeloff in Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608,
612-13 (4th Cir. 1961) (concurring opinion). It must be acknowledged that these
"civil" and collateral consequences of conviction may well have a more damaging
impact than the prison sentence itself. The PaxsmEmr's CommissioN oN LAw ENFORCF-
mNT AND ADMrs-nrToN OF JUsTICE, TAsK FORcE REPORT, CORREcTONs 88-92 (1967);
Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967). Carafas and Sibron
reduce, but do not eliminate, the possibility of mootness.
1061t might also be challenged on the basis of Martin if the date of eligibility for
parole would be advanced; on the basis of Tucker, if credit for time served on the
invalid sentence could be allowed on the valid sentence. See discussion, note 143
supra.
1971n some situations this past sentence may be attacked by coram nobis. See, e:g.,
Morgan v. United States, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). There petitioner was allowed to attack
a federal sentence which had already been served as there was no requirement of
"custody" for coram nobis. For citations dealing with alternative remedies, see note
12"' supra.
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Secondly, until such prior conviction has some substantial restraining
effect such as affecting chances of eligibility for parole,0 s it should be
considered de minimus for habeas corpus purposes. In providing for
an ideal system, it may well be argued with force that there should be
some provision for an "advisory opinion" proceeding to erase the stigma,
"civil" disadvantages, and employment handicap resulting from an in-
valid conviction even though there is no present effect on parole or
a recidivist sentence. 9 9 However, during the "interim" there is no cer-
tainty that there will be a future conviction and effect on future parole
possibilities. In terms of allocation of resources involved in providing
such a forum for all past-served sentences, it is submitted that this can-
not presently be justified.200 The judgments underlying this are sev-
eral. It is doubtful whether mere expunging of "the record of convic-
tion" can have any real impact in removing the stigma of being an
ex-convict without a basic change in the public attitudes which make
such status a handicap. 201 There are generally available legislative and
198 Or is detrimental in a Tucker sense, i.e., if voided and any credit may be al-
lowed on the valid sentence, then the past sentence should be considered a significant
restraint.
19 The real answer is for the states to provide a post-conviction remedy for these
moot cases. See text p. 49 infra.
200 The President's Crime Commission in its Task Force, Report on the Courts
has estimated that as a result of recent cases the most immediate need for legal man-
power felony charges-will require "for adequate representation of all felony defend-
ants in State and Federal courts [the] equivalent to the full-time services of between
1,700 and 2,300 lawyers each year." The report also estimated that between 300 and
1,000 lawyers would be required each year for appeals, collateral attacks and revoca-
tion hearings. Id. at 56. The report concluded: "The aggregate range of these esti-
nates is between 8,300 and 12,500, which represent the upper and lower limits of
the number of lawyer years needed to provide adequate representation for adult defen-
.dants in all criminal cases except traffic offenses each year. The actual number of
lawyers needed will, of course, be much larger than the number of lawyer years,
perhaps several times greater, because a large part of the need will be met by lawyers
who practice only part of the time in criminal matters. Furthermore, this estimate
does not include lawyers for delinquency proceedings in the juvenile courts. ...
Id. at 56. Also, there is a real need for counsel at the misdemeanor level-the "low
visibility" area. See generally Junker. The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43
WAsH. L. REv. 685 (1968). Equally critical is the need for lawyers in civil matters
in the "poverty" area. See, e.g., the views of Justice Douglas in Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (concurring opinion) and Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 325
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
201The computer age raises the question of whether even the record could be
erased. Once the record of conviction is fed into a criminal crime record computer-
e.g, much like credit information-and then proliferates out into numerous other
computers and data retrieval systems, it might be impossible to know the extent
of the dissemination of the record and to erase such a record. See A. WEs-nN, PvivAcy
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executive pardons which could be used, without involving judicial and
legal resources, in urgent cases where there is a showing of an im-
proper conviction. If the courts through habeas corpus were opened
up to such "advisory opinions," there is danger, perhaps unfounded,
that the courts would be flooded with such petitions. 2  Perhaps the
most compelling reason for not bringing these "interim moot convic-
tions" within the purview of federal habeas corpus (except as they
may become a substantial restraint with a later conviction) is that with
the removal by Walker and Peyton v. Rowe of the "immediate release"
and "prematurity" barriers and the removal in Carafas of the danger of
"mootness" through completion of the sentence before completion of
proceedings on the writ, it is hoped that with time there will be no
real need for an ex post servio habeas remedy. Under this liberalized
approach to custody, the single offender will at all times during service
of his sentence be allowed to challenge it by habeas corpus even though
the sentence may be invalid only in part.2 0 3 The limited legal resources
available should be expanded in preventing constitutionally defective
convictions and when the full impact of Douglas,2 4 Gideon,20 5 Mi-
randa,00 and Gault20 7 is felt, many basic constitutional defects should
be prevented, thus reducing the necessity for post-conviction relief.
Also, if competent counsel is provided to assist the prisoner in his initial
habeas corpus proceeding, this too would further reduce the necessity
for subsequent habeas corpus proceedings.208 Use of the limited re-
sources in these areas would be a more effective utilization and should
present an ample opportunity, under present standards, to exhaust the
possibilities and to discern the truth with finality. Should at some
Am FE zDom 298-326 (1967); Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy
and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 342, 365-71
(1966).
202 Many have expressed the view that the courts are already flooded with frivolous
petitions. See, e.g., Pope, Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applica-
tions, 33 F.R.D. 409 (1963); Pope, Further Developments in the Field of Frivolous Ap-
plications. Is Proliferation Probable?, 33 F.R.D. 423 (1963); Shaefer, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedure, 70 H~Av. L. Rxv. 1, 17 (1956).
2 03 If the state courts adopted a liberal approach to post-conviction remedies, e.g.,
that suggested by the A.B.A. SrTDAiws-Posr-CoNwcoto R .EDmEns, (Tent. Draft
Jan., 1967) which eliminates the requirements of custody, many of the contentions
should be resolved during the "exhaustion of state remedy" process.
204 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
205 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 0 0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
207 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
2 08 See text p. 56 infra.
1969J
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
future date the one-time offender be again convicted and then have
standing to challenge the prior sentence by habeas corpus, hopefully he
would already have been heard on his contentions during service of the
first sentence. Providing counsel in any prior habeas corpus petition
should increase this possibility. If his contentions have not been heard,
the writ would be available unless the subsequent conviction were a
non-parolable one.209
Turning to the multiple offender, under the rationale of Martin and
Williams, a fully-served sentence would not become moot until all
of the sentences had been served, as presumably this past sentence
would affect either date of the eligibility for parole or chances for pa-
role.21 0 If the subsequent sentence or sentences are non-parolable, the
past-served sentence could not be challenged as there would be no
effect on parole.211 When all sentences have been fully served, the
prisoner would be in the same position as the single offender de-
scribed above.
If only a sentence presently being served is challenged and there
are other valid concurrent or future sentences, the writ should be
available even though there may be no immediate release, as there is
present confinement under the challenged sentence. If only future
sentences are attacked, under Martin and Williams the writ should be
available if the future sentence affects chances for parole or present
eligibility for parole. Conceivably, there will be situations where avoid-
ing the future sentence will not advance the eligibility for parole so
that the prisoner will then be eligible, as in Martin, and thus present
209 Even if the prior invalid sentence had no effect on parole, it should be subject
to attack if any credit for time served on the invalid could be credited on the
subsequent valid sentence. See discussion, note 143 and note 198 supra.
210 This assertion is based on the typical parole statute under which the prisoner
must serve a specified minimum portion of his total sentence before he is eligible
for parole. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964) (prisoner eligible for parole after serv-
ing Y3 of term or after 15 years if a life sentence or sentence over 45 years); ARK.
STAT. ANN. .§ 43-2823 (1964) (after service of A); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-123.10 (1964)
(V3); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-251 (1967) (N if less than 48 or if total exceeds 48, a
minimum of 12); Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60
COLTJM. L. Rxv. 1134 (1960). Prior convictions generally are an important factor
affecting possibilities for parole.
211 These past sentences may have a Tucker-type restraint if credit may be allowed
on the present sentence. See discussion note 143 supra. In that event there should be
"standing" for habeas corpus. Also if the prior sentence is utilized under a recidivist
statute or the ineligibility for parole is attributable to the prior sentence, attack "by
habeas corpus should be allowed. See Stubblefield v. Beto, 399 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.
1968); Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1964).
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chances for parole are not affected, as in IlTilliams.212 It is at this point
that the "effect on present eligibility or present chances for parole"
,seems to have reached its limit and presents the greatest difficulty to
the Fourth Circuit approach. It should be noted that this is the area
of prematurity and its hazard of delay; holding the writ in abeyance
pending maturity, i.e., until there is present effect on the eligibility or
chances for parole, only pushes the sources of the truth farther into
the past. This essentially is the Rowe-Thacker situation where a suc-
cessful challenge to the future sentence would not advance the date
of eligibility so that petitioner would presently be eligible for parole
and thus not affect present chances for parole. The same problem could
arise where the prisoner is presently serving a sentence from which he
cannot be paroled and wishes to challenge a future sentence.2 13 Rowe-
Thacker suggests a reasonable approach for making the writ available
to attack future sentences. If the future sentence to be challenged will
with reasonable certainty (excluding the intervening death of the
prisoner) at some point in the future be subject to attack because it
then affects present eligibility for parole under Martin or because it
then affects present chances for parole by William2s4 or if the future sen-
tence may be attacked upon commencement of its service, then the
writ should be available immediately.' 5 Read broadly, Rowe-Thacker
says that if it is clear that at some point in the future the prisoner will
have standing to question the future or past sentence, the collateral
attack by habeas corpus should be allowed now. 16 The important
factor here is the hazard of stale or lost evidence due to suspen-
sion of the writ. There is assurance of at least some future restraint or
detriment resulting from the future sentence.
Under the Fourth Circuit approach a prior sentence which is used
as a basis for imposing an enhanced sentence under a "repeater" or
recidivist statute would be open to attack by habeas corpus. The prior
sentence contributing to the recidivist sentence may thus adversely
212 This could also be true where the present sentence is one from which parole
cannot be granted.
213 If the prisoner cannot be paroled from the present sentence because of the
future sentence, there would be a Martin type of restraint.
214 Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
215 See also Commonwealth ex. rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965),
discussed in text p. 28 supra.
210 Implicit in the holding of the Supreme Court in Peyton v. Rowe is the fact
that the sentences would be subject to challenge by habeas at some point in the dis-
tant future.
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affect the date of eligibility for parole. However, under some parole
statutes,. e.g., those of Virginia, the increase due to the prior invalid
sentence may not affect the date of parole eligibility.21 Once the pris-
oner is eligible for parole, the prior conviction could affect his chances
for parole and at that point, or when he began to serve the enhanced
portion attributable to the prior sentence, the recidivist could attack
the prior sentence. Then applying the Rowe-Thacker rationale, to
eliminate the risks of delay, challenge of the prior sentence by habeas
corpus should be allowed when the recidivist sentence is imposed.
The Fourth Circuit approach would also allow attack of one con-
current sentence even though the other is conceded to be valid. The
invalid one may affect either the date of parole, e.g., if the invalid sen-
tence were the longer, or may affect the chances for parole.218
A central question raised by the Fourth Circuit approach and the
foregoing analysis is whether such an approach depends too much
upon the type of parole statute and makes "standing" for habeas corpus
depend upon an irrelevant factor. A related question is what is left
of the mootness, prematurity and immediate release concepts? The im-
mediate release concept is rightly abandoned.2 1 The prematurity con-
cept is also abandoned. As has been shown above, in most cases there
will be some present or future adverse effect on parole which is a
legal restraint on freedom. Even if there is no such effect on parole,
there will be restraint under the sentence in the future which can be
challenged then but should be resolved now. The use of the parole stat-
utes is particularly relevant in past-served sentences, the area of "moot-
ness," to determine and insure that there is sufficient legal detriment
or restraint to justify habeas corpus relief.220 If the past sentence has
no such effect or is not invoked under a recidivist statute, the social
2 17 In Virginia to be eligible for parole, the prisoner must serve one-fourth of the
aggregate if less than 48, or if the total is over 48, a minimum of 12 years, or 15
if a life sentence. VA. CoDE ANN. 5 53-251 (1967). Thus, if the prisoner got fifty years
on the underlying second conviction and received five years as a recidivist, the recidivist
sentence would not affect date of eligibility for parole.
218 It has been suggested that the sentences should also be treated as one if
there were no effect on the date of eligibility for parole. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391
F.2d 54, 64 (4th Cir. 1968); Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Thomas v.
Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964). See also discussion in note 194 supra.
219 See discussion, note 190 supra.
220 As noted, it is in the area of "mootness" that the Supreme Court has not given
a clear indication as to what remains of "mootness." See text p. 37 supra. Carafas
did not deal with the truly moot sentence, i.e., one fully served at the time the peti-
tion was filed. It is perhaps significant that the Court in Carafas did cite Thomas which
involved fully served sentences. See 391 U.S. 234, 240, n. 14 (1968).
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stigma and hardship should be considered de minimis for federal habeas
corpus relief.
There are other difficulties with the approach. Suppose, for example,
that the past sentence or the future sentence to be served was received
in a state other than the state in which the petitioner is presently in-
carcerated, or that the prior sentence, allegedly invalid, invoked un-
der a recidivist statute was received in another state. The Fourth Cir-
cuit in Rove-Thacker suggested certain limits upon that holding by
saying "that the writ is available to attack any sentence, service of
which will be required in the future by the same custodian who pres-
endy detains the prisoner." 221 Is such a limitation necessary to at-
tack future or past sentences under the Fourth Circuit approach?
There is a difficult question here of the propriety and desirability, in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding, of requiring the custodian state
to defend against constitutional challenge a past or future sentence im-
posed by another state. Is it a sufficient answer to say that if the cus-
todian state is utilizing or will use such a sentence in such a manner as
to have an inhibiting effect on parole or uses it as the basis for an en-
hanced recidivist sentence, then it should be prepared to defend the
validity of the sentence received in another state? 2 2 Does this assure
221383 F.2d at 717. The Supreme Court in Peyton v. Rowe, involving a future sen-
tence, did not suggest such a limit. Quaere whether in the light of Word v.
North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969), the Fourth Circuit will so restrict use
of the writ. See discussion p. 49 & note 222 infra.
2 22 Cf. State ex tel. Holm v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d 161 (1965). A
similar problem area, presenting many of the same difficult procedural questions, is
that of a detainer filed by another state with the custodian state. Do the changes in
custody have significance for this area? These detainers, which may be based on a
conviction or merely an indictment or complaint filed against the prisoner, in many
instances may seriously limit the possibilities of parole or affect the type of confine-
ment. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969). Should habeas corpus be allowed to
challenge the validity of the charge or conviction upon which the detainer is based
where the "present restraint" is attributable to such a future or potential sentence?
In other words, is a prisoner "in custody" under a detainer? Could proper relief
be afforded? May a state prisoner in New York, by a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court in that state, challenge a detainer filed by Florida? Does Peyton v.
Rowe provide the answer by suggesting that the future Florida sentence of a prisoner
presently incarcerated in New York can now be attacked by habeas corpus in a
Florida District Court? There is authority which indicates that the writ will not be
available in the demanding state: "The courts have long taken the position that the
proper party respondent is 'some person who has immediate custody of the party
detained, with the power to produce the body of such party-before the court or
judge. . . .' Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)", cited in Sokol, supra note
120, at 39. Earlier under Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), it seemed clear that
a district court had no jurisdiction if the petitioner was not detained within the terr-
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that there will be sufficient interest by the custodian state to insure
that such a hearing will not be merely an ex parte suit not disputed
by the state, or to conclude that if the custodian state does not have
sufficient interest to defend the out-of-state sentence, then it should
not be permitted to assert its detrimental effect? Or should federal
habeas corpus attack of past and future sentences be limited to those
of the custodian state as suggested by Rowe-Thacker, thus requir-
ing that the custodian state defend only its own sentences even
though it may "use" other out-of-state sentences? Can such a dis-
parity in availability of the writ-allowing attack of "in-state" con-
victions but not "out-of-state" convictions-be justified? Requiring
the custodian state to defend the sentence imposed by another would
present difficult problems of availability of records, witnesses and evi-
dence. By analogy, the repeater or recidivist statutes may be helpful.
In such statutes, where out-of-state convictions may be used, the United
States Supreme Court in Chewning v. Cunninghamv23 held that the
state had such an interest. Although there appears to be no clear holding
by the United States Supreme Court that an attack on the constitutional
torial jurisdiction of the court where the petition was filed. See also Whiting v. Chew,
273 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1960); Comment, G.l.'s Overseas and Habeas Corpus, 1 STAN.
L. REv. 555 (1949). However, the continuing validity of these cases may be ques-
tioned in view of the expansion of the reach of the writ from physical restraint to
other types of restraint such as parole and "collateral consequences." Here again
the Fourth Circuit has taken a lead in Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th
Cir. 1969) in allowing use of the writ to attack detainers. The court said: "We have
for decision the question whether in light of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct.
1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426, federal habeas corpus provides a present remedy for a state
prisoner seeking to attack, on constitutional grounds, a conviction in another state
which underlies a detainer filed with his keeper. We hold that it does and that
the action is properly brought in a district court in the demanding state.' 406 F.2d
at 353. The majority felt that Abrens v. Clark did not preclude use of the writ even
though the petitioner was not physically present within the jurisdiction of the district
court where the petition was filed. But see the dissenting opinions of Winter and
Sobeloff respectively. Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352, 362, 364 (4th Cir. 1969).
They felt that Abrens v. Clark was still controlling. The majority indicated
there may be situations where the writ would be available in the state of confine-
ment to challenge a detainer filed by another state. Sobeloff was of the opinion that
the state of confinement was the proper forum to attack the detainer. Cf. Desmond
v. United States Board of Parole, 397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1968).
2 368 U.S. 443 (1962). The recidivist statute under which Chewning had been
convicted provided for use of out-of-state convictions. One means of avoiding the
problem is by not making use of the out-of-state convictions. See, e.g., Simms v. Cun-
ningham, 203 Va. 347, 124 S.E.2d 221 (1962), where an "equal protection" attack was
made against a state policy of invoking only "in-state convictions under the recidivist
statute."
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validity of such prior sentences must be allowed in the recidivist hear-
ing, there seems to be little doubt that denial of such an opportunity
would be a denial of due process. 224 If it is thought necessary to require
the asserting state in a recidivist proceeding to defend the constitutional
validity of an out-of-state conviction, should it not also be appropriate
to require the "custodian state" in a habeas corpus proceeding to de-
fend out-of-state convictions, past or future, which are asserted with
a detrimental effect on parole in the custodian state? It should be noted
that these difficult problems could exist should states adopt a liberal
approach such as the Fourth Circuit or that suggested by the American
Bar Associations' Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies,
which recommends that the availability of post-conviction relief should
not be dependent upon the applicant's attacking a sentence of imprison-
ment then being served or other present restraint, but should be avail-
able even as to future sentences and completely served sentences.2
Perhaps therein lies the solution to the perplexing questions above.
Should each state provide such a broad post-conviction relief pro-
cedure,226 then the prisoner could be required to obtain a determination
in the state rendering the sentence which should then be recognized
2
,
24 In Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1962), the Court said: "Virginia
has held that the validity of any of the prior convictions used to bring the multiple
offender statute into play, may be inquired into. . . These may involve judgments
of conviction in any state or federal court in the Nation. . . A trial under this
statute may present questions such as whether the courts rendering the prior judg-
ments had jurisdiction over the offenses . . . whether in a prior trial the defendant
was represented by counsel and whether it was a fair and impartial trial." And in
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 454 (1962), also a recidivist case, the Court said: "Indeed
we may assume that any infirmities in the prior conviction open to collateral attack
could have been reached either because the state law so permits or due process so
requires." Dissenting in the same case, Justice Douglas said: "A hearing under these
habitual offender statutes requires 'judicial hearing' in order to comport with due
process... . The charge of being an habitual offender is also effectively refuted by
proof that the prior convictions were not constitutionally valid. . . ." Id. at 455.
See also Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back Law", 48 VA. L. REv. 597 (1962);
Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convctions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions,
33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1958).
-2 A.B.A. SrAmanms RELtATiNG To PosT-CoviscntoN REMFDiEs, 5 2.3 (Tent. Draft
Jan., 1967). This proposal would go beyond the Fourth Circuit approach and would
allow attack on the truly "moot" cases-e.g., past-served sentences where there is no
subsequent conviction or potential effect on parole or under a multiple offender statute
-with certain limits on relief for stale claims and a present need for requested re-
lief. See comment, id. at 41-5.
226As discussed before, the impact of Rowe, Walker and Carafas may well -be
that the states will be compelled to adopt such a liberal post-conviction procedure
or else they'will be bypassed. See text p. 54 infra.. .
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in the custodian state, making it unnecessary for the custodian state to
defend these challenges. Making the prisoner resort to this state remedy
as part of the exhaustion of remedies requirement should then eliminate
much of the difficulty and hopefully avoid the necessity for federal
habeas corpus. For the present, however, the question will remain
whether the limit of Ro'we-Thacker should be retained or attack of
out-of-state sentences allowed. Surely there should be no limit.
However, to provide a federal remedy, perhaps it is not necessary
that habeas corpus be used in the custodian state to challenge such sen-
tences, past or future, or charges pending in another state. First, as
to charges pending in another state, which may affect present detention
even though not promptly prosecuted, there is a remedy, enforceable
in federal courts under the sixth amendment guarantee of a right
to a speedy trial, by mandamus in the state in which the charges are
pending. This was illustrated during the past term of the Court by
the decision in Smith v. Hooey.22  a Secondly, if the Fourth Circuit
is correct in its recent decision of Word v. North CarolinalGb that
Ahrens v. Clark does not preclude use of the writ in a federal dis-
trict court in which the petitioner is not physically present, then future
(or past?) sentences may be challenged in the sentencing state. The
Word approach has the advantage of placing the proceeding in the
sentencing district where records, witnesses, etc., are more readily avail-
able and where the sentencing state may be made a party to respond to
the writ.226" Again, the Fourth Circuit in Word is blazing the trial as
to use of the writ in attacking future and past sentences rendered out-
side the custodian state.
VIII
JUSTIFICATION FOR A LIBERAL APPROACH TO CUSTODY
In making an evaluation of what is a valid approach to custody in
226a 393 U.S. 374, (1969). Smith, a prisoner serving a term in a federal penitentiary
in Kansas, sought by mandamus to compel dismissal of pending, but unprosecuted,
charges in a Texas State Court. Mandamus had been denied by the Texas Supreme
Court. The United States Supreme Court, noting that such charges could affect the
duration and condition of petitioner's present imprisonment, said: "[W]e hold today
that the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial may not be dispensed with so
lightly either. Upon the petitioner's demand, Texas had a constitutional duty to make
a diligent good faith effort to bring him before the Harris County [Texas] court for
trial." 393 U.S. at 383.
226b See note 222 supra.
226c The opinions in Word highlight the problems of using the writ in eitber the
custodian state or the sentencing state.
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federal habeas corpus, one central fact should be kept in mind. This
fact is that a state prisoner asserting a constitutional defect in his trial
or conviction will be afforded a habeas corpus or some other post-
conviction remedy, either in a state or federal court and such pro-
ceeding must be of a nature to meet the requirements of Tovnsend v.
Sain.2 7 The approach suggested by the American Bar Association's
Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies~a" seems to be based
on a recognition of this fact. It may be acknowledged that a liberal
approach to post-conviction remedies such as that of the Fourth Circuit
or the American Bar Project may afford a remedy where previously
there generally had been no remedy, either federal or state, e.g., in
cases of mootness, and may even go beyond what is compelled by the
recent Supreme Court decisions. Yet as the above analyses of the
Fourth Circuit approach have shown-e.g., the prior or future sentence
and its effect on parole-the previously unchallengable invalid convic-
tion may have as much present adverse effect as one for which there
was a remedy. In the past too often there seems to have been a failure
to recognize that it is not a question of whether or not there will be
a remedy and an inquiry into the validity of the conviction, but that
it is a question of whether a remedy will be afforded now or in the
future. There seems to have been in some courts a vague attitude of
antagonism to the use of the writ as a post-conviction remedy and a
feeling that if things were delayed long enough, then maybe the prob-
lem would go away or become moot. This attitude is coupled with the
often voiced complaint that the changes in and liberal use of habeas
corpus are flooding the courts with frivolous petitions. However, can
misuse or abuse of a remedy justify its denial or suspension in the hope
that a guaranteed constitutional right will not be asserted? If the Great
227Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). This right to a federal writ is, of course,
subject to the requirements of exhaustion of presently available state remedies [Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)], and to the requirements of the recent Federal Habeas
Corpus Act of 1966, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess. 2
(1966). Note, 45 Tax. L. REv. 592 (1967). There is a question of whether a state
is required to provide a post-conviction remedy. Schaefer stated: "It has been fre-
quently stated, in opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and elsewhere, that
the decision in Mooney v. Halohan [294 U.S. 103 (1935)] laid down the requirement
that each state must afford some corrective judicial process by which a claim of vio-
lation of constitutional right can be tested in the state court. There have been ref-
erences in the opinions to the 'duty' resting upon the states to provide such a remedy."
Schaefer, supra note 74, at 16. In any event, within the above restrictions, if there
is no state remedy, federal habeas corpus will be available to state prisoners.
22sA.B.A. STANDARaS RLATIG To Posr-CoNwenoNr RF_mEs, (Tent. Draft Jan.,
1967).
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Writ is to continue to play its historical and traditional function, its
availability should not be predicated upon its misuse or upon making its
invocation difficult to curb unfounded use. The measure of its value
should not be gauged in terms of its abuse. There is no way to insure
that by making the availability of the writ difficult, there will be an
effective screen, filtering out or discouraging frivolous petitions but
at the same time permitting and not discouraging meritorious claims
which the writ is designed to protect. It is probably true that the more
readily available the writ is, the more frivolous petitions there will be,
as well as more meritorious ones. Yet the opponents of a liberal ap-
proach to availability of the writ failed to show how a restrictive ap-
proach to custody can function as a selective filter on frivolous peti-
tions.229
Perhaps the most compelling reason for abandoning the concepts
of "mootness," "immediate release" and "prematurity" has already been
pointed out. The longer the delay in affording a remedy, the farther
in the past the questioned circumstances will be and the greater the
difficulties of determining what these circumstances were. In this re-
spect all three branches of custody are alike in that their invocation
brings the blur of time if a remedy is to be available sometime in the
future. This blur may have a prejudicial effect, not only upon the
chances of the petitioner establishing his contentions, but also upon the
state.23 ' The delay does not always bear with an equal impact upon
both the state and the prisoner. Too frequently it seems the state has
not recognized that delay may not be in its best interest. In a habeas
corpus proceeding the petitioner will be entitled to release or at least
a new trial upon a showing of a constitutional defect by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence.23' Whereas upon retrial, the state would
229 The observation of Judge Schaefer that much of the recent increase in the
use of the writ is due to accessibility to the courts seems also to suggest that the
unquestioned greater protection given to individual and constitutional rights in re-
cent years by means of the writ is also due to a concomitant greater availability
of the writ. Schaefer, supra note 74.
230 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) quite vividly illustrates this prejudicial result.
The petitioner in that case had been convicted in 1942, solely on the basis of a
coerced confession, although there seemed to be little question of his guilt. This con-
viction was finally overturned in 1963 by means of habeas corpus. The Court pointed
out: "Even though Caminto and Bonino still remain under indictment, it is most
probable that they will never be tried again. . . . The obtaining of new evidence
would appear at this late date impossible." Id. at 396.
231 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938) (dictun). The impact of such
cases as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), requiring states to furnish indigent
defendants with a transcript of the trial proceedings, may have mitigated against
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have its usual burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If there can
be no retrial or reconviction upon retrial, due to loss of evidence,
then the state may have lost whatever benefits of rehabilitation, etc.,
which might have come from conviction. Further, the state has a
valid interest in protecting the "appearance of justice." Failure to re-
try or reconvict may unjustly reflect upon the integrity of the crim-
inal process. Such reflections where caused by loss of evidence due to
delay should be eliminated if possible. The aim in post-conviction re-
view should be to have the hearing on the merits, if there is to be one,
at the earliest date, not one of delay for "ripeness" at some future date.
Such an approach is consistent with all the demands underlying provi-
sions for "speedy trial." 232 Custody, as it traditionally has been involved,
inherently conflicts with the rationale of the guarantee of a speedy trial.
Is there any more reason to delay the retrial by habeas corpus than
to delay the initial trial? As has been shown, in many instances there
may be more of a present restraining or adverse effect in the post-con-
viction stage than in the pre-trial stage.
With respect to the prematurity concept, there are other factors
which make it particularly oppressive. In a Thomas-type2 3 case, why
should the prisoner with several short-term sentences be compelled to
begin service of a potentially invalid sentence which may be fully
served and thus moot, before he can be heard and the sentence set
aside? If there is no reconviction or credit given on other offenses,234
there is no adequate means of restoring or compensating for the time
served under the invalid sentence. Mere expunging of the record does
not restore the lost time spent in prison or under restrictions not shared
by other free men. The majesty of the Great Writ is that no price
may be put on liberty, nor should there be a requirement that the
challenged sentence "begins to hurt" by present restraint before the
writ is available. Delaying the use of the writ may merely be an invita-
tion to while away the interim filing of other frivolous petitions. Pris-
oners are indeed notorious for "adopting" the latest decision as their
such blurring by making states more careful in preserving the "record" which fre-
quently had not been done. Cf. A.B.A. SrTANaRs RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuMrY, § 1.7
(Tent. Draft Feb., 1967), recommending a verbatim record of pleas of guilty includ-
ing inquiry into the voluntariness and accuracy of the plea. However, these develop-
ments will not completely solve the problem as often the basis for attack on habeas
corpus will involve matters and facts outside the court record.
222 See generally A.BA. STANDARS RELATNG To SpEwy Tvama, (Tent. Draft May,
1967).
233Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1964). See text p. 24 supra.
2
-
3 4 See text p. 30 supra.
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own, whereas an early complete hearing and development of the true
facts might prevent or preclude subsequent unfounded petitions.
In a different context of habeas corpus, Professor Bator has made a
plea for finality in criminal cases at an early date so that the rehabili-
tative process, disrupted by lack of finality, may begin. ' If finality
aids the rehabilitative process, this would seem to urge that the con-
cepts of custody which delay finality should be eliminated.
Equal protection and fairness considerations are present also. Why
should prisoner A, who has been convicted of two crimes, the second
of which is to be served in the future and is patently invalid, as in
Thomas, be forced to wait to attack the second sentence when prisoner
B, who is not a multiple offender, may presently attack his sentence
which was received for the same offense, at the same time and shares
the same constitutional defect as prisoner A? Is there a valid basis for
the difference in the availability of a remedy?2-6 Prisoner A may well
be denied parole because of the invalid conviction.
Ix
THE IMPACT OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH ON THE STATES
A proper federal-state working relationship would suggest that ques-
tions raised on habeas corpus by state prisoners should be resolved by
the states so long as there is compliance with the mandates of Fay v.
Noia l3 and Townsend v. SainY s8 The states should bear the front line
responsibility for reviewing and policing their own courts with the
federal courts remaining in a position of secondary resort if there is
no adequate state remedy or hearing meeting the requirements of Fay
and Townsend. However, in maintaining this proper relationship, dis-
parities in the federal rule on custody and the state rule can only con-
tribute to an imbalance. If, for example, the Commonwealth of Virginia
continued to adhere to its approach based on McNally and denied use
of the writ to one attempting to attack a future sentence he is not yet
serving, the end result would be that the full burden of reviewing such
state cases would fall on the federal courts, as there would then be no
existing state remedy and the state courts would be completely by-
235 ]Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. R~v. 441, 452 (1963).
236 For a discussion of the possibilities of a group petition raising common claims,
see Note, Multi-Party Habeas Corpus, 81 HARv. L. Rxv. 1482 (1968).
237 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2-38 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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passed as in Williams and Rowe.Y On the other hand, if a state takes
a progressive approach, as has Maryland under the Uniform Post-Con-
viction Procedure Act,240 and abandons the requirement of custody, it
may well be that a petitioner may exhaust (e.g., in attacking future
sentences) the present state remedy, and relief may be denied on some
independent adequate state ground. Even though the state hearing may
be such a review as would not meet the requirements of Townsend to
bar federal relief, petitioner would have been compelled to wait until
the sentence was being served for a federal remedy if the federal rule
had continued to be McNally. The federal review then could have been
so delayed that it may have had very little value as a stimulus to the
state court to afford an adequate review initially or to make its pro-
cedures conform to constitutional standards. The more remote the fed-
eral review, the less its corrective impact will be on deficiencies in the
state criminal process. It would seem apparent that the state and fed-
eral rule should be compatible with both court systems providing a
remedy without regard to the traditional application of custody.
X
RESOLVING THE BASIC 'PROBLEMS
Perhaps no discussion of the Great Writ is complete without looking
at the basic factors giving rise to the need for such a remedy. The
great increase in the use of habeas corpus is attributable in large part
to alleged constitutional defects, either in the trial or in events leading
up to the trial. Several commentators have suggested that the real
solution to the basic problems which have caused this increase is to
provide and to insure that persons accused of crime are represented
by competent counsel.241 Competent counsel, provided at an early
230 This is precisely what was happening. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th
Cir. 1967), a case arising in Virginia. Following the Fourth Circuit decision in Rowe-
Tbacker, the Virginia legislature apparently recognized this fact and modified its
statutory provision to allow attack of suspended and future sentences. It is not
clear from the statute if any change was made in the "mooness" area. VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 8-596 (1964). This liberalization of the state remedy is having the desired result
of compelling a petitioner to seek redress through the state remedy before resorting
to the federal writ. See, e.g., Strouth v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1968) (remand
to hold in abeyance pending exhaustion of expanded Virginia state remedy permitting
challenge of future sentences).
240 Simon v. Director, 235 Md. 626, 201 A.2d 371 (1964).
241Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ, New Role: An Overhaul for State
Criminal Justice, 45 B.U. L. REv. 161, 205-06 (1965); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus.
Postconsiction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U.PA. L. REv. 461 (1960). Reitz stated:
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stage, should contribute significantly to reducing the need for habeas
corpus by preventing many of the defects and raising the constitutional
questions in the initial trial. In this respect Gideon,242 Miranda,2 43 Doug-
las,244 and Wade 4 5 may greatly reduce the occasions for habeas corpus
in the future. Developments in other areas such as pre-trial discovery
may also contribute to a reduced need for post-conviction remedies
by allowing areas of potential constitutional deficiency to be explored
initially. For example, the recent case of Miller v. Pate246 might well
have been prevented with adequate pre-trial discovery and not left to
"discovery" by habeas corpus years later. Additionally, much of the
present flood of habeas corpus petitions is no doubt due to the retro-
active effect of cases such as Gideon and other constitutional decisions
which, in effect, "changed the rules." Once this temporary backlog
of "stale" cases is dealt with and such rights are pressed and preserved
initially and the cases become current, undoubtedly there will be a
further decrease in the number of habeas corpus petitions. How long
this "temporary problem" will last is, of course, unclear. 247 In any
event, there undoubtedly will be a continuing need for habeas corpus.
Here, too, assistance of counsel should contribute to reducing multi-
plicity of petitions.24  If counsel is provided to assist indigent prisoners
in their initial post-conviction attack and given the opportunity to
fully develop any potential defect which may be raised on habeas
corpus, there should be a consequent reduction of the number of peti-
tions and piecemeal litigation of defects-raising one question now, one
"But the one factor which contributes most to the necessity for collateral attack
is the lack of counsel to represent the accused. Id. at 465.
242 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
243 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
244 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
245 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
246 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
247Perhaps one of the factors which may have influenced some courts to abide by
the old custody requirements was the fear of adding to the flood of habeas corpus
petitions. Elimination of these barriers may temporarily increase the flood, although
as noted earlier, it may only be a matter of allowing the petition now, rather than
in the future. See Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rmv. 63, 249
(1968). Cases decided since Walker, Carafas, and Peyton v. Rowe seem to bear this out.
See, e.g., Velasquex v. Rhay, 408 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1969); Lydy v. Beto, 399 F.2d 59 (5th
Cir. 1968); Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1968).
248 1t has been suggested, and no doubt this was one of the intended purposes.
that the Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1966, supra note 227, will also reduce the
number of petitions by state prisoners. See Note, Habeas Corpus, Custody and Declara-
tory Judgment, 53 VA. L. REv. 673, 698 (1967).
[Vol. 4: 1
1969] -'- HABEAS CORPUS 57
later. Although at the present there seems to be no decision of the
United States Supreme Court holding that counsel must be provided
in habeas corpus proceedings, one may venture the guess that there
would be such a requirement were the Court to decide the question.a4a "
However, many courts have taken the position that habeas corpus is a
civil remedy and therefore there is no requirement that counsel be
provided.249 It would seem clear that providing counsel would be bene-
ficial to all parties involved and may well be a more efficient use of
resources than failure to do so.250 Central to this question is the fact
248a Cf. the various opinions in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The majority
held that in absence of other sources of assistance, the State of Tennessee could not
prohibit "jailhouse lawyers" from assisting other prisoners in preparation of habeas
corpus petitions. Justices Black and White expressed the view that: "[Ilf the prob-
lem of the indigent and ignorant convict in seeking post-conviction relief is sub-
stantial, which I think it is, the better course is not in effect to sanction and en-
courage spontaneous jailhouse lawyer systems but to decide the matter directly in the
case of a man who himself needs help and in that case to rule that the state must
provide access to the courts by ensuring that those who cannot help themselves have
reasonably adequate assistance in preparing their post-conviction papers. Ideally, per-
haps professional help should be furnished and prisoners encouraged to seek it so
that any possible claims receive early and complete examination. But I am inclined
to agree with Mr. Justice Douglas that it is neither practical nor necessary to re-
quire the help of lawyers. . . The same legislative judgment which should be
sustained in concluding that the evils of jailhouse lawyering justify its proscription
might also support a legislative judgment that jailhouse lawyering under carefully
controlled conditions satisfies the prisoner's constitutional right to help." Id. at 501
(dissenting opinion).
249See, e.g., Flowers v. Oklahoma, 356 F.2d 916, 917 (10th Cir. 1966), where the
court said: "... habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, and it is settled law that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts." Harris
v. United States, 371 F.2d 160, 165 (7th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion); Summers v.
Rhay, 67 Wash.2d 898, 410 P.2d 608 (1966). But see Sokol, supra note 120, at 72.
He suggests that it is fairly clear that there is a constitutional right to counsel on
habeas corpus. Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal.2d 226, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (19.65);
People ex rel. Harris v. Ogilvie, 35 Il.2d 512, 221 N.E.2d 265 (1966); People v.
Hughes, 15 N.Y.2d 172, 204 NE.2d 849 (1965).
250 Counsel is seldom provided to assist in preparation of the initial application and
frequently legal aid organizations are uninterested in post-conviction proceedings.
Note, Multiparty Habeas Corpus, 81 H~Av. L. Rxv. 1482, 1484 (1968). The PamE's
Co.L=,ssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION oF JusnCF, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, COuRTS, 54 (1967) concluded: "The need for counsel in collateral attack is
particularly acute because the issues often are important and highly technical, and
the offender seeking collateral relief is confined in an institution and is less able to
investigate relevant legal and factual matters. Petitions from prisoners are often a
jumble of rambling factual assertions and legal conclusions culled from the latest
appellate reports that have made the prison rounds. It is often impossible to identify
the claims made or to discern their factual or legal bases. Hours may be spent by
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that the Supreme Court has made the basic judgment that wading
through the numerous petitions, searching for the needle in the hay-
stack must be done to insure that one may not be convicted except by
the law of the land. Perhaps one feasible way of aiding in this would
be to provide "house counsel" for indigents in prisons who would be
available to prisoners who contemplated or sought to use habeas corpus
in a state or federal court. Once such house counsel gained the confi-
dence and respect of the prisoner by showing that he would effectively
present any legitimate claims, but not those unfounded or frivolous,
and his advice became accepted, this might greatly decrease the num-
ber of frivolous petitions which clog the courts. Yet it would also
assure that the one innocent person whom the system seeks to protect
would have his case effectively presented in such a manner as to be
noticed and not lost among the clutter due to ineffective presentation
in a pro se petition. If tried, such a procedure may well be justified in
terms of a saving in judicial time and that of other court officials. After
dealing with the numerous cases and problems concerning the concept
of custody, one cannot help wondering how many might well have
been disposed of on their merits with no greater expenditure of re-
sources than was consumed in dealing with the concept of custody.
CONCLUSION
As the court has observed, the Great Writ of Liberty "is not now
and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy . , 2. 1 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has continued in the spirit of
the tradition-Darnel's case, the Petition of Right, the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, the Reconstruction Habeas Corpus Act-in its
reappraisal and abandonment of the concept of custody. Its lead fore-
shadowing the demise of prematurity, mootness and immediate release
has been followed by the Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit in its
decided cases and their logical extension has outlined a workable ap-
proach for federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, abolishing the
the judge or prosecutor in determining from the prisoner's papers and from previous
records of the case whether he has grounds to justify collateral relief. Moreover, the
petitioner may have additional facts or claims which are not reflected in his papers
and which will be the basis of subsequent attempts to gain freedom...
"... On the other hand, if counsel is provided and adequately represents a prisoner
in his first postconviction proceedings, it would obviate the need for subsequent hear-
ings on claims once raised and litigiated and would substantially reduce the burden
of reviewing the merits of successive petitions."
251 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963).
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traditional concept of custody except in one area of mootness. Even
there it may be that the state should provide a post-conviction pro-
ceeding to relieve the substantial civil disabilities and handicaps which
may flow from an invalid conviction. The suggested approach, tied
to present or future effect on eligibility or chances for parole or some
other substantial detriment, such as use in a recidivist statute, insures
that there is some substantial restraint to justify the use of federal habeas
corpus and stops short of hearing all cases of mootness which may not
justify expenditure of judicial time, etc. Of foremost importance, such
an approach avoids the needless hazard of delay in making a remedy
available. With the removal of the "prematurity" and "immediate" re-
lease concepts, "finality" may be reached at an earlier date. Recognizing
that there must be a hearing on constitutional claims, this developing
trend in the federal writ speaks to the states to provide an equally broad
state post-conviction remedy, else they will default on their prime
responsibility of insuring the integrity of their own criminal process.
Fundamentally, the point which should not be obscured is that the
Great Writ is the device for insuring the right of access to the courts
as protectors of civil rights and liberties.
1969]
